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Abstract
This works describes the results of a three year project to improve the radia-
tion tolerance of the Quench Protection System of the CERN Large Hadron
Collider. Radiation-induced premature beam aborts have been a limiting
factor for accelerator availability in the recent years. Furthermore, the fu-
ture upgrade of the Large Hadron Collider to its High Luminosity phase
will further increase the radiation load and has higher requirements for the
overall machine availability. Therefore equipment groups like the Quench
protection groups have used the last years to redesign many of their systems
to fulﬁll those requirements. In support of the development of radiation-
tolerant systems, several proton beam irradiation campaigns were conducted
to determine the inherent radiation tolerance of a selection of varied elec-
tronic components. Using components from this selection a new Quench
Protection System for the 600 A corrector magnets was developed. The ra-
diation tolerance of this system was further improved by developing a ﬁlter
and error correction system for all discovered failure modes. Furthermore,
compliance of the new system with the speciﬁcation was shown by simulating
the behavior of the system using data taken from the irradiation campaigns.
The resulting system is operational since the beginning of 2016 and has in
the ﬁrst 9 months of operation not shown a single radiation-induced fail-
ure. Using results from simulations and irradiation campaigns the predicted
failure cross section for the full new 600 A Quench Protection System is
4.358 ± 0.564 · 10−10cm2 which is one order of magnitude lower than the
target set during the development of this system.
Abstract
Diese Arbeit beschreibt die Ergebnisse von drei Jahren Bemühungen die
Strahlentoleranz des Quench Protection Systems am CERN Large Hadron
Collider zu verbessern. Strahlungsinduzierte vorzeitige Strahlabbrüche waren
ein limitierender Faktor für die Beschleunigerverfügbarkeit in den letzten
Jahren. Darüber hinaus wird das zukünftige Upgrade des Large Hadron
Collider auf seine High Luminosity-Phase die Strahlungsbelastung weiter er-
höhen und höhere Anforderungen an die gesamte Maschinenverfügbarkeit
haben. Aus diesem Grund haben Gerätegruppen wie die Quench-protection
Gruppe die letzten Jahre genutzt, um viele ihrer Systeme neu zu gestalten,
um diese Anforderungen zu erfüllen. Zur Unterstützung der Entwicklung
strahlentoleranter Systeme wurden mehrere Protonenbestrahlungskampag-
nen durchgeführt um die inhärente Strahlungstoleranz einer Auswahl von ver-
schiedenen elektronischen Komponenten zu bestimmen. Mit Komponenten
aus dieser Auswahl wurde ein neues Quench Protection System für die 600 A
Korrekturmagnete entwickelt. Die Strahlungstoleranz dieses Systems wurde
weiter verbessert, indem ein Filter- und Fehlerkorrektursystem für alle erkan-
nten Fehlermoden entwickelt wurde. Darüber hinaus wurde die Übereinstim-
mung des neuen Systems mit der Speziﬁkation gezeigt, indem das Verhalten
des Systems unter Verwendung von Daten aus den Bestrahlungskampagnen
simuliert wurde. Das daraus resultierende System ist seit Anfang 2016 in
Betrieb und hat im ersten 9-Monatsbetrieb keinen einzigen strahlungsin-
duzierten Ausfall gezeigt. Mit den Ergebnissen von Simulationen und Be-
strahlungskampagnen beträgt der vorhergesagte Ausfallquerschnitt für das
neue 600 A Quench Protection System 4.358 ± 0.564 · 10−10cm2 was um
eine Größsenordnung niedriger ist als das Ziel, das während der Entwicklung
dieses Systems gesetzt wurde.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Large particle accelerators, like the Large Hadron Collider (LHC), are used
for collision experiments to create new particles. Particle accelerators can
also be used to create an environment similar to the early time of the uni-
verse, enabling us to take a look into this mostly unknown period of time.
But every reaction that one wants to observe requires a certain collision
energy to be possible. Therefore to discover unknown reactions and parti-
cles a machine with collision energies higher than what previously existed
is required. Furthermore, each reaction only has a very low probability of
occurring for every given collision at a suﬃcient energy level. Therefore, to
increase the chance of observing an unknown reaction it is necessary to in-
crease the number of collisions. The number of collisions is proportional to
the integrated luminosity which is the integral of the luminosity of the ma-
chine over the time it is able to sustain this luminosity (see chap. 2.1). The
future upgrades to the LHC will increase the luminosity to the highest level
where the produced amounts of data can still be processed by the high lu-
minosity experiments (ATLAS and CMS). Therefore, further increase of the
integrated luminosity can only be achieved by improving the availability of
the accelerator (see chap. 2.2). Unfortunately, an increase in luminosity also
produces an increase of the radiation level in the vicinity of the accelerator.
This level of radiation can cause the superconducting magnets of the accel-
erator to turn resistive (which is called a Quench) which has the potential
to damage the accelerator (see chap. 3). To protect the machine from such
events a dedicated protection system to detect and to respond to Quenches
is required (see chap. 4). But like all electronic systems this very protection
system is not immune to the radiation levels at its locations (see chap. 5
and 6). Due to the, for accelerator facilities, unprecedented level of radiation
present around the accelerator, shielding cannot completely prevent the ir-
radiation of the protection systems. Most other accelerators have radiation
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levels low enough to only cause few problems. The only similar challenging
environment is outer space where cosmic radiation is strong enough to also
damage electronic equipment. Fortunately, there exist several methods for
designing and protecting electronic systems in order for them to be able to
operate in such a radiation ﬁeld (see chap. 7). In the scope of this work, a
new protection system for the 600 A magnets was developed (see chap. 8).
This includes irradiation campaigns to determine the radiation tolerance of
the base components, analysis of the found failure modes, development simu-
lation and testing of mitigation measures and ﬁnal tests of the system under
radiation. Furthermore, several other irradiation campaigns were conducted
to collect data about components which are either already used or planned
parts of future projects (see chap. 9 and 10). The results of this work were
very good and the components developed will help to increase the overall
accelerator availability of the LHC (see chap. 11).
11
Chapter 2
Introduction to the LHC
2.1 Physics at the Large Hadron Collider
The Large Hadron Collider (LHC) in Meyrin Switzerland at CERN is cur-
rently the highest-energy proton/hadron collider [1]. First oﬃcially men-
tioned in 1984 at a workshop in Lausanne and inaugurated in 2008, the LHC
was built to address several fundamental questions of particle physics:
 Search for the Higgs boson to understand the mechanism creating the
masses of elementary particles
 Search for supersymmetric particles and other predictions of approaches
beyond the standard model of particle physics and identify candidates
for dark matter
 Understand the mechanism creating the asymmetry between matter
and antimatter in the universe
 Characterize the quark-gluon plasma
The Higgs boson was found in 2012, but the others questions remain open
[2][3].
The LHC is a 27 km long proton/hadron collider built in the tunnel
previously occupied by the Large Electron-Positron Collider (LEP). Using the
Proton-Synchrotron (PS) and the Super-Proton-Synchrotron (SPS) as pre-
accelerators the LHC can reach beam energies in the order of 7 TeV. To keep
the beam on a circular orbit the LHC comprises of powerful superconducting
magnets with ﬁeld strengths of up to 8.33 T. This machine allows for proton-
proton collisions with center of mass energies up to 14 TeV.
12
Figure 2.1: LHC layout [4]
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In order to reveal physics beyond the standard model, it is necessary to
maximize the number of collisions inside the experiments. The amount of
events of a speciﬁc type is given by
N = L · σEvent. (2.1)
The cross section σEvent is an eﬀective area that describes the probability
of a speciﬁc scattering event occurring as a result of the crossing of two beams
of discrete particles. For the collision of to identical beams in a circular
collider, the luminosity of the machine L is given by
L =
N2b · nb · frev · γr
4pi · n · β∗ F. (2.2)
Here Nb is the number of particles per bunch, nb the number of bunches
per beam, frev the revolution frequency, γr the relativistic gamma factor,
n the normalized transverse beam emittance, β∗ the beta function at the
collision point and F the geometric luminosity reduction factor due to the
crossing angle at the interaction point (IP)
F = (1 + (
θc · σz
2 · σ∗ )
2)−1/2. (2.3)
Here θc is the full crossing angle at the IP, σz is the root-mean-square
(RMS) bunch length and σ∗ the transverse RMS beam size at the IP [5].
The LHC's two high luminosity experiments ATLAS [6] and CMS [7] can
process events created by a luminosity up to L = 1034 cm−2s−1, which is
necessary to observe events with low cross section. Current upgrades will
lead to an increase of the luminosity that these experiments can process by
a factor of three [8]. Besides a high luminosity, it is also necessary to achieve
a high percentage of time were a beam with this luminosity is available
for physics experiments. During a successful run in the accelerator, the
target luminosity can be achieved for some time followed by a phase of slowly
degrading luminosity due to beam losses and other beam eﬀects [9]. Therefore
there is a maximum integrated luminosity that can be gained during one
accelerator cycle.
2.2 Availability and Physics Eﬃciency
CERN is constantly in the process of upgrading the LHC to reach higher
integrated luminosity. The goal for the High Luminosity phase of the LHC
(HL-LHC) is an annual integrated luminosity of 250-300 fb−1 and 400 fb−1
14
during ultimate conditions. With a baseline of 160 days per year with physics
runs this would require about 1.9 fb−1 per day. For comparison the annual
integrated luminosity in 2012 was only 23 fb−1 and 23 fb−1 in the ﬁrst 7
months of 2015. Because this integrated luminosity goal can not be achieved
by only increasing the luminosity the accelerator availability has to be in-
creased signiﬁcantly. Limiting factors are the frequency of faults and the
length of downtime due to faults. Faults that force a physics beam to be
aborted prematurely are an important limiting factor for the integrated lu-
minosity.
Figure 2.2 shows the relation between the ratio of prematurely aborted
beam, the average fault time and the achievable integrated luminosity [10].
Figure 2.2: Relation between the ratio of prematurely aborted beam, the
average fault time and the achievable integrated luminosity. The stars show
the situation in 2012, the achievable results after applying mitigation measures
against radiation-induced faults and the ﬁnal goal during HL-LHC [10].
Figure 2.3 shows the distribution of the duration of the periods with
stable beams for the year 2015. In a large parts of the ﬁlls the beams were
aborted in the ﬁrst few hours.
Besides actual faults in the system, a signiﬁcant part of premature beam
dumps is caused by radiation-induced errors in the systems. In 2012 a total
of 585 premature dumps were counted and 56 could be attributed to faults
caused by the inﬂuence of ionizing radiation. 31 of those premature dumps
were triggered by the Quench Detection System (QDS). The total amount of
beam aborts caused by the QDS is only about double that number, making
radiation eﬀects responsible for 50% of all QDS aborts in 2015 [10]. Follow-
ing a fault, measures have to be taken to return the accelerator to working
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Figure 2.3: Stable beam duration in 2015 [11]
conditions. These measures include:
 Diagnosis of the fault by control room and remotely by experts
 In some cases intervention in the machine by an expert
 Recovery from the impact of a fault (for example cool down of magnets
after a quench)
 Return to operation conditions (recovery from access, precycle, injec-
tion etc.)
Depending on fault type fault recovery can take several hours or even
days in case of serious faults. Figure 2.4 shows the respective fault times of
the LHC systems for the year 2015 [12].
Following the recovery from a fault, the accelerator has to return to stable
beam conditions. The Turnaround consists of the following phases:
 Ramp down/pre-cycle
 Pre-injection checks and preparation
 Checks with set-up beam
 Nominal injection sequence
 Ramp preparation
 Ramp
 Adjust/collisions
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Figure 2.4: Downtime of the accelerator due to the various systems in 2015
[12]. As can bee seen the Quench Protection system (QPS) has been a major
source of accelerator downtime.
The turnaround time, which averaged to about 5.5 hours in 2012, is an-
other source of downtime which is lost for physics operation. All of these
factors inﬂuence the availability of the accelerator. The availability (A) of
an accelerator is deﬁned as the time planned during which a proton beam
should be available for physics experiments (Scheduled proton Physics Time
SPT) minus the time assigned to faults and fault recovery expressed as a
percentage of the SPT. Another important characteristic is the physics eﬃ-
ciency (PE). It describes the duration while the accelerator is available and
can supply a stable beam for experiments. The relations between availability
A and physics eﬃciency PE with Nf being the number of accelerator ﬁlls
in the measurement frame and Tfill and Taround being the time spent either
during a stable beam or during turnaround of the beam [13], are given by
PE = A · SPT −Nf · Taround, (2.4)
Nf =
A · SPT
Tfill + Taround
, (2.5)
and hence
PE = A · SPT · (1− Taround
Tfill + Taround
). (2.6)
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In order to achieve the goals of the LHC, it is necessary to optimize avail-
ability and PE of the accelerator further. In the year 2015, the availability
of the LHC was 68% for runs with a 25 ns bunch spacing. Long term goals
for the LHC high luminosity phase (HL) target an availability of around 90%
[14]. The whole system will have to mature considerably to reach this goal.
To increase the availability there are several factors that can be modiﬁed like
the frequency of faults and the speed of recovery after a fault. Reducing the
frequency of faults that require the abort of the beam would also increase
the PE because the production of a new stable beam requires time (Taround).
The last years have seen a reduction in the turnaround time by measures like
combining the energy ramp with squeezing (reducing beam circumference in
preparation for collision). Still, the average turnaround time in 2015 was
about 8.8 hours or 6.8 hours if only ﬁlls without serious faults are counted
[11]. Faults in a system can also be categorized as those that have their ori-
gin in a real problem of the machine, like a quenched magnet (see chap. 3),
and those that originate from errors in the various protection systems. Pro-
tection systems are required for the safe operation of accelerator equipment
(e.g. superconducting magnets), as well as for operating with beams that
have signiﬁcant damage potential to prevent beam induced damage. Their
detection systems are vulnerable to the eﬀects of ionizing radiation which can
induce signals that mimic critical conditions inside the accelerator and lead
to an abort of the ﬁll (see chap. 5). This works presents several eﬀorts made
in support of the update the Quench Detection System (QDS). The goal is
to protect the system from radiation-induced errors in order to increase the
overall accelerator availability and physics eﬃciency. A special focus is put
on the development of a new QDS for the 600 A corrector magnets (see chap.
3.2). Further the results of several irradiation campaigns are discussed which
provide valuable data concerning components that can be used in the future
development of radiation-tolerant systems
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Chapter 3
Superconducting magnets of the
LHC
3.1 Superconducting magnets
Because the LHC was built in the tunnel previously occupied by LEP, the
radius of the accelerator was ﬁxed by the already existing tunnel radius. A
synchrotron like the LHC uses a magnetic ﬁeld to keep charged particles
traveling close to the speed of light on a circular orbit. Due to the ﬁxed
radius and the higher mass of the accelerated particles, the LHC requires a
ﬁeld strength about forty times higher than LEP. At energies of 7 TeV, a
magnetic ﬁeld of 8.33 T is required [5]. Achieving such a ﬁeld strength using
normal conducting magnets is possible but impractical. The current con-
sumption of such magnets would be very high and the cooling system would
not be able to cope with the ohmic heating of the magnet. Therefore most
magnets of the LHC are superconducting. Superconductivity is a state where
some materials lose all electric resistance if cooled below a critical temper-
ature [15]. This eliminates the losses due to ohmic heating in the magnets.
The superconducting magnets used for the LHC use proven NbTi technology.
Previous machines using such magnets are the Tevatron [16], HERA [17] and
RHIC [18] which cooled the magnets down to temperatures of 4.2 K reaching
magnetic ﬁelds around 5 T. Increasing the magnetic ﬁeld further is not triv-
ial because every superconductor has a maximum magnetic ﬁeld, depending
on material, geometry, current density and temperature, after which it tran-
sitions to normal conductivity [19]. To enable ﬁelds of 8-8.5 T, superﬂuid
helium is used to cool the magnets below 2 K. But lowering the tempera-
ture by more than a factor of two has the detrimental eﬀect of reducing the
heat capacity of the superconductor by almost an order of magnitude [15][5].
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Therefore the energy necessary to raise the temperature per degree is lower
than at higher temperatures. This makes it more probable for a small energy
deposition into the magnet to raise the local temperature above the critical
temperature which causes that spot of the magnet to transition to normal
conductivity. Ohmic heating of that point increases the temperature in that
spot further leading to a loss of superconductivity in the magnet. This pro-
cess is called a quench. A Quench has the potential to heavily damage a
magnet due to the large amount of energy stored in the magnets. Hotspot
temperatures inside the magnet during a quench can reach temperatures to
melt the magnet material. It is not possible to prevent the occurrence of
quenches perfectly. Therefore several protection measures are in place to
protect magnets during a quench by extracting the energy from the magnet
circuit and preventing extreme hot-spot temperatures using quench heaters
(see chap. 4). Even if the protection is successful the aﬀected magnets have
to be cooled back to superconductivity before the operation can resume. This
process takes a considerable amount of time which impacts the availability
of the accelerator.
3.2 Magnet layout of the LHC
The LHC comprises eight sectors (see ﬁg. 3.1) each reaching from one in-
teraction point to the next. Each Sector contains one ARC, two Dispersion
Suppressors (DS), two Matching Sectors, two inner triplets and one Interac-
tion Point (see ﬁg. 3.2).
The ARCs are the curved sections of the accelerator containing the main
bending dipole magnets (MBA and MBB). Each ARC comprises of 23 lattice
cells that can each be separated into two half cells (see ﬁg. 3.3). Each half
cell contains three bending dipoles and a Short Straight Section (SSS).
To achieve the required ﬁeld quality to operate the LHC, the dipole mag-
nets are equipped with Sextupole (MCS) and Decapole (MCD) spool correc-
tor magnets. Each decapole corrector will, in addition, have an Octupole
insert (MCO) and these together are designated as MCDO [20]. These
spool piece correctors mitigate systematic sextupole and decapole ﬁeld er-
rors in the dipole ﬁeld [21]. The SSS contain the sets of Focusing/Defocusing
Quadrupoles (MQ) that focus the beam to counteract the natural angular
divergence of the beam. Further, the SSS contain several corrector magnets
that compensate imperfections in the ﬁeld of a dipole, quadrupole, and other
corrector magnets (see tab. 3.1).
Before and after each arc a dispersion suppressor (DS) is used to reduce
the machine dispersion (momentum spread of beam particles). Each LHC
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Figure 3.1: Overview of the LHC [5]
dispersion suppressor consists of four individually powered quadrupole mag-
nets (MQ, MQML, MQML+MQM) which are separated by two dipole mag-
nets (MBA and MBB [22]). The DS also contain further corrector magnets
for Skew, Trim, and orbit correction.
The DS is then followed by a matching section whose magnetic setup is
unique for the speciﬁc Insertion Region (IR). The matching sections contain
3 types of matching quadrupoles and further orbit and trim correctors.
Several interaction points are ﬂanked by a pair of dipole separation mag-
nets. For the experiment points these magnets (D1/D2) bring the two beams
onto a collision orbit and the separate them again beyond the collision point.
Currently, the D1 magnets of the high luminosity experiments are normal
conducting magnets due to the high radiation levels. During the HL-LHC
phase, those will be replaced with superconducting magnets. At the RF
point, a pair (D3/D4) separates the beam so that individual RF cavities can
be installed for each beam.
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Figure 3.2: General layout of the sections that make up the LHC. Inner
triplets are only present around the 4 IPs that house a physics experiment [5]
Figure 3.3: Layout of an ARC cell of the LHC. The ARC cell is separated in
two half cells each with 3 bending dipole magnets and a short straight section.
The bending dipoles are further equipped with spool piece corrector magnets.
For the 4 interaction points that house a physics experiment, the interac-
tion point is ﬂanked by an inner triplet which utilizes quadrupole magnets to
focus the beams before their collision. For the full list of magnets see table
3.1.
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Figure 3.4: Example layout of one type of several types of short straight
sections used in the LHC [5]
3.3 The 600 ampere magnet system
All magnets listed in the previous chapters have their own protection system
to detect losses of superconductivity and execute protection measures to pre-
vent damage. Depending on the magnet type and their current level diﬀerent
protection methods are necessary (see chap. 4.1). This work focuses mainly
on all magnets that are operated in a range of ±600 A and their Quench
Detection System (QDS). The 600 A magnets are corrector magnets that are
used for orbit correction and to mitigate higher order ﬁeld errors of the main
dipoles and quadrupoles. They can be found in all parts of the accelerator
(ARC, Short-Straight-Sections, Dispersion Suppressor, Matching section and
the inner triplet). Table 3.2 lists the magnet families belonging to the 600 A
system, their function and their respective position in the accelerator.
23
Family Name Description System Nummber
MB Dipole Bending Magnet ARC 1232
DS
MCS Sextupole Spool Corrector ARC 2464
MCD Decapole Spool Corrector ARC 1232
MCO Octupole Spool Corrector ARC 1232
MQ Focusing/Defocusing Quadrupole SSS 392
DS
MO Landau dampening Octupoles SSS 336
MQT Tuning Quadrupoles SSS 320
MQS Skew Quadrupoles SSS 64
MSCB Skew Sextupole + SSS 688
Dipole Orbit Correctors DS
MQTL Trim Quadrupole DS 120
Matching Section
MQML DS 36
Matching Section
MCBC Closed Orbit Corrector DS 908
Matching Section
MQMC DS 12
MQM Matching Quadrupole DS 38
Matching Section
MQY Matching Section 24
MCBY Closed Orbit Corrector Matching Section 88
MBX (D1) Separation Dipole Before Inner Triplet 4
MBRC (D2) Separation Dipole Before Inner Triplet 8
MBRS (D3) Separation Dipole Before Inner Triplet 4
MBRB (D4) Separation Dipole Before Inner Triplet 4
MQXA Triplet Quadrupole Inner Triplet 16
MQXB Triplet Quadrupole Inner Triplet 16
MCBX Orbit Corrector Inner Triplet 48
MCSTX Sextupole/Decapole Corrector Package Inner Triplet 8
MCSOX Skew Sextupole-Octopole Corrector Inner Triplet 8
MQSX Skew Quadrupole Inner Triplet 8
Table 3.1: Superconducting magnets of the LHC
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Magnet Family Description Position
MO Main Octupole SSS
MQT Tuning Quadrupole SSS
MQS Skew Quadrupole SSS
MSCB Skew Sextupole + SSS
Dipole Orbit Correctors DS
MCS Spool piece Sextupole Corrector ARC
MCO Spool piece Octopole Corrector ARC
MCD Spool piece Decapole Corrector ARC
MQTL Trim Quadrupole DS
Matching section
MCBX Orbit Corrector Inner Triplet
MQSX Skew Quadrupole Inner Triplet
MCSOX Skew Sextupole-Octopole Corrector Inner Triplet
Table 3.2: 600 A Magnets
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Chapter 4
Magnet protection system
4.1 Quench protection methods
A transition away from superconductivity poses two diﬀerent threats to a
magnet: high temperatures due to ohmic heating and high voltages due to a
growing resistance at high currents [23] [24]. High temperatures can destroy
the insulation material or even result in a meltdown of the cable. High volt-
ages can cause electric discharges that could melt holes into the insulation
of the cables. Furthermore, high current density and temperature can irre-
versibly degrade the superconducting material reducing its current carrying
capability [25]. In the LHC diﬀerent protection methods are used according
to magnet type. Magnets with higher current or lower critical temperature
require more protection than less fragile magnets. The protection system can
contain the following components:
 cold bypass diodes
 quench heaters
 energy extraction
 cold parallel resistor
Table 4.1 shows the components that are used to protect magnets in a
certain current range.
Not all magnets require the full set of protection measures [26]. Most
magnets in one family are connected in series and depending on their opera-
tion current store large amounts of energy. The higher the energy stored in
the chain the more protection measures are required. Due to technical limits
and to limit maximum energy and voltage in a magnet chain, the chains do
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Magnet ≤ 600 A 6 kA + 13 kA 13 kA
Current Individ. powered
Cold bypass diodes  X X
Dump resistors X (most)  X
Quench heaters  X X
Parallel resistor X (most)  
Table 4.1: Protection measures used in the various quench protection systems
not extend beyond one sector. If no precautions were taken, all the energy
in such an electrical circuit would be deposited in the quenching magnet.
Quench protection uses both passive and active methods. The passive meth-
ods include choosing cable material and design techniques that provide more
operational margin. The active methods used at the LHC are described in
the following chapters. Figure 4.1 shows the full protection system for the
main dipoles.
Figure 4.1: Protection system for the Main Dipoles [27]
4.1.1 Quench Heater Strips
As soon as a quench in a magnet circuit is detected, the power converter of
that circuit is deactivated leading to a decay of the current. The speed of this
decay is dependent on the resistance of the magnet chain. This process is
sped up by heating large parts of the magnets. By turning the whole magnet
resistive the stored energy does not dissipate at a single spot which would
cause destructive hot-spot temperatures. This is done by activating Quench
heaters, heater strips that cover the outside of the magnet coils. Heating
only parts of the magnet is enough because quenches propagate into the rest
of the magnet with velocities of 15 m/s to 20 m/s. A 400 mm long section
would be fully quenched in less than 10 ms [28]. The increase of resistance
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of the magnet also increases the voltage over the magnet above the turn-on
voltage of the Cold Bypass Diode.
4.1.2 Cold Bypass Diode
The current in the magnet chains decays usually over a time in the order of
a few 100 ms. Letting a high current ﬂow through the now resistive magnet
could damage it due to resistive heating. To prevent this, a cold bypass
diode that is connected in parallel to each magnet is used to route most of
the current around the quenching magnet. During normal operation, the cold
diodes have a turn-on voltage of 6 V. The turn-on voltage is high enough for
the diode to remain inactive during normal magnet ramps (about 1 V for
main dipoles with 10 A/s). During a quench, the rising resistance of the
magnet and the corresponding voltage activate the diode which starts to
conduct. The following warming of the diode further decreases the turn-on
voltage allowing most of the current to ﬂow through the diode instead of
the magnet. To speed up the activation of the diode, quench heaters are
activated as soon as a quench is detected [25].
4.1.3 Energy Extraction
The decay of the current using only the resistance of the quenching magnets
can take hours depending on the stored energy in the circuit. The high cur-
rent ﬂowing through the quenching magnet during this time would damage
the magnet. To speed up the process in a magnet circuit it is possible to
use a dump resistor to extract the energy. The dump resistor is connected in
series to the magnet circuit and can be switched on with by opening a switch
(see ﬁg. 4.1). This is necessary for all magnet circuits that store energy equal
or higher than 2 kJ like the 13 kA main dipole and main quadrupole magnets
and several of the 600 A magnet systems [5]. The dimension of the dump
resistor is chosen according to how long the rest of the circuit can withstand
the high voltage during a quench [25].
4.2 Quench Detection System
All of the superconducting components of the LHC need protection in case
of a loss of superconductivity. To ensure the activation of proper mitigation
measures for quenches it is necessary to detect them as fast as possible. This
is performed by dedicated quench detection systems (QDS). Each type of
magnet family has a QDS system customized for its operation environment
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and instrumentation. While all quenches have to be detected to ensure the
protection of the magnets it is also necessary to prevent erroneous activation
of the magnet protection systems. Every activation of the quench protection
measures caused the beam to be dumped and quench heaters to heat up the
aﬀected magnets. The re-cooling of those magnets below critical temperature
requires minutes to hours depending on circuit type. Therefore errors in the
QDS can strongly impact the availability of the accelerator. Furthermore, all
QDS systems are installed close to the accelerator which subjects them to,
depending on their exact location, varying levels of ionizing radiation. Ra-
diation is an additional source of errors for electronic systems and decreases
their lifetime (see chap. 5).
4.2.1 Main Dipoles and Lattice Quadrupoles
In case of the main dipoles and lattice quadrupoles the detection of quenches
is accomplished by measuring the resistance in the two apertures using an
analogue Wheatstone bridge like setup (see ﬁg. 4.2). The voltage over both
apertures is constantly measured and compared with each other. In case of a
transition away from superconductivity in one of the apertures, the voltage
will increase signiﬁcantly. If the voltage diﬀerence between both apertures
increases above a system-speciﬁc threshold, the magnet protection system
is triggered. To prevent erroneous triggers due to the inﬂuence of noise,
the trigger signal is routed through a time discriminator [29]. To protect
the magnets against aperture symmetric quenches a second type of quench
detectors was installed. The symmetric quench protection system compares
the total magnet voltage of four electrically adjacent dipoles. In case the
diﬀerence of one of the four voltages with respect to the others exceeds the
threshold, the heaters of this magnet are triggered.
4.2.2 Insertion Magnets
Magnets in the insertion regions are mostly individually powered and there-
fore can not be compared to adjacent magnets for quench detection. There-
fore the voltage of the ﬁrst and second half of the same magnet is compared
with each other (see ﬁg. 4.3). For this purpose, the magnet has a voltage
tap at its midpoint. A diﬀerence between both magnet halves higher than a
magnet-speciﬁc threshold is considered as a quench.
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Figure 4.2: QDS for main dipoles and lattice quadrupoles. The setup forms
a Wheatstone bridge allowing for the calculation of the resistance in the coils
if the values of one coil and both resistors are known.
4.2.3 Corrector Magnets
Instead of local quench detection using mid-point voltage taps, the 600 A
circuits use a global system monitoring the whole circuit. By utilizing current
sensors at the ends of the current leads, the expected voltage of the circuit
in a superconducting state can be calculated. A comparison between the
measured and the expected voltage in a 600 A magnet circuit (see ﬁg. 4.4)
is given by
URes = UDiff − L(IDcct) · (δIDcct
δt
+
δUDiff
δt
· 1
RPar
). (4.1)
Here UDiff is the voltage measured over the whole circuit and IDcct is the
current ﬂowing through the circuit. URes is the diﬀerence between measured
voltage and an expected voltage calculated under the assumption that the
circuit is superconductive. If the diﬀerence between expected and measured
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Figure 4.3: QDS for the individually powered magnets in the insertion region.
The voltage over both magnet halves is measured and compared using two
ADCs and an FPGA.
voltage passes a threshold of 100 mV this is considered as a quench. The
calculation of a derivative of both current and voltage requires a high preci-
sion measurement of both values. Derivation of low-resolution measurements
would easily produce spikes suﬃciently high to trigger the QDS.
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Figure 4.4: A simpliﬁed schematic of a 600 A magnet circuit. The whole
circuit is in a state of superconductivity. During normal operation RPar is
the only resistance in the circuit and is a constant value. The inductance
inductance of the coil L is taken from a table that correlates current with
inductance. By measuring and deriving Idcct it is possible to compute the
expected voltage to compare with the measured voltage Udiff
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Chapter 5
Radiation eﬀects
5.1 Eﬀects of radiation on electronics
Before 1978, radiation-induced errors were considered mainly as a problem
for space applications. Cosmic rays consisting mostly out of high-energy pro-
tons, neutrons, electrons and alpha particles were known to cause issues with
electronic components in satellites and space crafts. At sea level, radiation-
induced errors were not considered to be a source of problems due to the
shielding eﬀect of the atmosphere. 1978 this proved to be a misconception
with the paper by T.C.May and M.H.Woods detailing radiation-induced er-
rors in processor cores due to uranium-contaminated packaging material [30].
There are two general types of inﬂuence radiation can have on electronic sys-
tems: single-event eﬀects (SEE) and cumulative damage. Cumulative dam-
age can further be separated into the eﬀects of total ionizing dose (TID) and
displacement damage (DD). Cumulative damage is caused by prolonged ex-
posure to high-energy radiation which causes damage to the semiconductor
lattice and surrounding layers. SEEs are caused by single ionizing particles
passing a semiconductor lattice and creating additional free charge carriers.
If the free charge reaches a critical level QCrit [30], an SEEs is produced. The
type of SEE produced depends on the circuit type and speciﬁc location of the
critical charge in the circuit. Furthermore, SEEs can be separated into soft
errors causing a temporary error in a system, which can be ﬁxed, and hard
errors that permanently damage or destroy a system. The physics of these
eﬀects is further discussed in the following sections. In 1979, J.F. Ziegler
and W.A. Lanford predicted SEEs at sea level [31], which was conﬁrmed by
IBM in 1984 [32]. Later in 1995 a new source of soft errors was discovered
in electronic devices containing borophosphosilicate glass. Upon capturing
a thermal neutron boron-10 isotopes ﬁssure 10B(n, α)7Li and the created α
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and Li recoil particles were shown to cause soft errors [33]. In general, col-
lecting historical data about soft errors is challenging because it is diﬃcult
to trace back occurring errors to radiation. Furthermore, companies are usu-
ally unwilling to reveal information about problems with their equipment.
Two other known events which could be attributed to soft errors happened
2004 at Cypress Semiconductor [32] and 2005 at the Los Alamos National
Laboratory [34].
5.1.1 Displacement Damage
Interaction of ionizing particles with matter can both inﬂuence the electrons
and the nucleus of a lattice atom. An interaction with the nucleus can change
the position of the atom within the lattice of materials like silicon. Such an
interaction creates a vacancy in the lattice and an interstitial atom called a
Frenkel pair. Such disturbances of the lattice are called displacement dam-
age. Electrons and low energy protons create single pairs while neutrons and
higher energy hadrons can create large cascades of Frenkel pairs. Most of
those pairs (≈ 90%) recombine quickly, but a fraction remains stable [35].
The displaced atoms and vacancies form additional energy levels in semicon-
ductor materials which leads to a change in the electrical properties of the
material. The additional energy levels serve as recombination centers for mi-
nority carriers and therefore reduce their lifetime and diﬀusion length. This
can, as an example, lead to an increased forward threshold in components
like PIN diodes. Suﬃcient radiation ﬂuence can even cause an inversion of
the electrical properties of a n-doted semiconductor into a p-doted [36]. The
unit of reference for this type of damage is 1-MeV equivalent neutron ﬂuence.
5.1.2 Total ionizing dose eﬀects
A much larger part of the energy lost by ionizing radiation is in the form of
ionization. Valence electrons are excited to the conduction band and create
electron-hole pairs in the material. For a short time every solid, even an
insulator, will have a higher concentration of mobile charge carriers. Only
a small amount of energy is necessary to create a single electron-hole pair.
Therefore the energy of the radiation is less important for total dose eﬀects
than for atomic displacement. The creation of electron-hole pairs causes
damage to MOS and bipolar devices through the accumulation of charges in
oxide ﬁlms. Electrons have a chance to escape non-conductive oxide ﬁlms
due to their high mobility preventing the recombination with another hole.
This leads to a continuous increasing positive charge in the oxide layers.
This charge alters the conductivity of all surrounding semiconducting layers
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altering the electrical properties of the component. All eﬀects caused by the
build-up of charge in oxide layers are collectively called total ionizing dose
eﬀects [36]. The unit of reference for this type of damage is total ionizing
dose (TID) measured in Gray (Gy).
5.1.3 Single-event eﬀects
The source of soft errors in electronics is the energy deposited by ionizing
radiation on their way through a semiconductor. For this purpose, it is
unimportant if the radiation stems from cosmic rays, radioactive decay or
stray radiation from a particle accelerator. By passing through the semicon-
ductor lattice such radiation will inject energy into the material producing
electron-hole pairs. Furthermore by collision with lattice atoms they can cre-
ate a cascade of secondary ionizing particles which in turn create even more
electron-hole pairs. The type of eﬀect that is caused by this depends on what
type of circuit is hit. But generally, if the produced charge is bigger than a
device speciﬁc critical charge QCrit and the charge is collected by source or
drain then the behavior of the device is inﬂuenced. A MOSFET transistor,
as shown in ﬁgure 5.1, is one typical example for a component vulnerable to
single-event Eﬀects (SEE).
Figure 5.1: A transistor like the one shown in this ﬁgure is controlled by the
voltage between source and gate. The electric ﬁeld created by this voltage is
used to either enrich or deplete the charge carriers in the area between source
and drain. This switches the gate between a conducting and non-conducting
state. A strike by an ionizing particle (proton, neutron or alpha particle) injects
energy into the semiconductor along its path thus creating many additional free
charge carriers. These charge carriers weaken the depletion zone separating the
source from the drain contact. If the accumulated charge is greater than QCrit
it leads to a radiation induced signal in the circuit.
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How many charge carriers are liberated by a passage depend on the stop-
ping power of the striking particle and the cross section for inelastic inter-
action with lattice atoms. A 10 MeV alpha particle has a stopping power of
about 10 keV/µm. The energy to liberate a electron-hole pair is 3.6 eV so it
can produce 2.8 ·104 electron-hole pairs/µm equaling a charge of 4.5 fC/µm.
With QCrit values reaching from 1− 4 fC [37] this would be enough to cause
a SEE if most of the charge would be collected. The representative unit for
SEEs is the integrated hadron ﬂuence above 20 MeV high energy hadron ﬂu-
ence (HEH). Hadrons of lower energy are not considered to be able to reach
the sensitive areas of the device with enough energy to induce an SEE [38][39].
This energy threshold does not apply to neutrons [40][41]. While charged
particles can directly liberate electron-hole pairs, uncharged neutrons cannot
interact electromagnetically with the lattice. Instead, they collide with nuclei
in the semiconductor creating several secondary nuclear fragments. Many of
those are charged particles able to create ionization tracks in the semiconduc-
tor [42]. The amount of charge produced is often enough to surpass QCrit,
but the chance of a collision of the neutron with semiconductor nuclei is
very small. Therefore the amount of neutrons necessary to create the same
amount of soft errors as with protons/alphas is 5 times as big [43]. Therefore
a contribution from 0.2-20 MeV neutrons is added to the HEH forming the
equivalent HEH ﬂuence (HEHeq). Furthermore contributions from thermal
neutrons [44] [45] and the increasing cross sections for hadrons in the GeV
range [42] have to be taken into account.
The value of QCrit is usually determined empirically by injecting current
pulses of diﬀerent strength into the device until it malfunctions. Using QCrit,
the single-event rate (SER) can be described by:
NSER = C · Φ · A · e−
QCrit
QColl (5.1)
The constant C is dependent on several factors like process technology and
circuit design style. The Flux Φ is the ionizing radiation in the environment
of the circuit and area A the vulnerable area of the circuit. QColl is an
eﬃciency ratio of produced charge carriers to collected charge carriers.
A radiation-induced signal in a circuit does not always cause an error in
the system. An induced signal inside the combinatorial part of a circuit is
called a single-event transient (SET). To actually have some inﬂuence on the
system, a SET has to be captured by a latch or ﬂip-ﬂop. For this to happen
the SET has to reach a ﬂip-ﬂop element at the same time as a clock pulse
5.2.
Another possible SEE is a memory element that is directly struck by
ionizing radiation. A SRAM cell like the one shown in ﬁgure 5.3 is a typical
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Figure 5.2: Depending on which part of a digital circuit(e.g. an FPGA)
is hit by radiation the type of error occurring changes. A hit in the combi-
natorial parts causes a momentary spike in current which propagates further
into the circuit. A long-lasting change in the state of the system only hap-
pens if this spike gets clocked into a synchronous part of the FPGA. Most
SETs do not transform into SEUs this way because the SET has to reach the
synchronous element without attenuating too much and during the setup-hold
time. Therefore faster systems with a higher clock frequency have a higher
chance of creating SEUs this way.
memory element often used for storing data. It has two stable states and
does not change its state as long as transistors M5 and M6 are closed. An
ionizing ray producing more than QCrit in free charge carriers in the bulk of
one of the internal transistor M1−M4 can cause the SRAM cell to ﬂip from
one stable state into the other one and remaining there. While this does
not cause any permanent damage to the cell the data stored within is lost
and could cause serious malfunctions of the whole system depending on the
importance of the bit.
According to their inﬂuence on the system, SEEs can be separated into
soft and hard errors. Soft errors do not permanently inﬂuence or damage the
system. The following SEEs are soft errors [36]:
 Single-Event Transient (SET): Current pulse due to free charges. Can
cause non-transient eﬀects if it is captured by a register.
 Single-Event Upset (SEU): Injected charge changes the state in a bi-
stable element like an SRAM cell. The change is permanent until the
cell is rewritten.
 Single-Event Functional Interrupt (SEFI): Single-event possibly related
to an upset in a control register that temporarily locks the device.
Hard error have a permanent eﬀect on the system usually by destroying
it unless speciﬁc countermeasures are in place. Examples for hard errors are:
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Figure 5.3: This ﬁgure shows a basic schematic of an SRAM cell. As long
as the transistors at M5 and M6 are closed, the system should remain static.
But ionizing radiation can induce a voltage in the base of one of the internal
transistors M1 −M4. This leads to a permanent switch from one of the two
stable states into the other which then will remain stable again. Such an event
is called an SEU (Single-event Upset).
 Single-Event Latch-up (SEL): Due to the placement of several transis-
tors in the shared substrate of an integrated circuit, ionizing radiation
can activate an additional parasitic thyristor. This short circuit be-
tween transistors can destroy the device if no protection measures in
place.
 Single-Event Burnout (SEB): Increased current between drain and source
of a MOSFET destroys the component.
 Single-Event Gate Rupture (SEGR): Destruction of the gate dielectric
of a MOSFET.
38
Chapter 6
Radiation levels at CERN
There are three primary sources of the radiation in the vicinity of the LHC:
 The beam interactions at the collision points of the accelerator experi-
ments. This radiation ﬁeld mainly aﬀects the experiments and the DS
sections. The eﬀects scale with the produced luminosity.
 Beam losses at the collimators. The aﬀected areas are the vicinity of
the collimators. The strength of this eﬀect is highly dependent on the
collimator settings and the beam parameters.
 Interaction of the beam with residual gas atoms. This can occur at any
point of the accelerator. The eﬀect is proportional to the beam current
and the pressure of the residual gas.
The impact of these three sources depends on the location of the elec-
tronic systems. Figure 6.1 shows the location of all installed 600 A QPS
which are the focus point of this project. The most critical locations of those
shown are the RRs 13,17,53,57,73 and 77 (areas with increased tunnel radius
and shielded compartments for electronics) which are either in the vicinity
to the two high-luminosity experiments Atlas and CMS or close to a beam
cleaning section (Collimators). Table 6.1 shows the high-energy hadron ﬂu-
ence (HEH) and the TID measured in 2015 and predictions for the year 2016
and the HL-LHC phase. There is already a signiﬁcant increase in radiation
level at some parts of the accelerator between 2015 and 2016. The HL-LHC
phase will operate with even higher luminosity and also increased beam cur-
rent. Therefore, electronic systems will have to be designed to withstand a
radiation level 10-20 times higher than the current one.
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Figure 6.1: The red circles in this ﬁgure mark the positions of the 600 A
QPS. Positions with the highest radiation level are the RRs next to the two
high luminosity experiments Atlas and CMS and to the collimators in point 7.
[46]
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Critical Measured Prediction Prediction
Areas 2015 2016 HL-LHC
HEH/cm2 HEH/cm2 HEH/cm2
Gy Gy Gy
RR13 1.44·107 7.15 · 107 58.4 · 107
0.029 0.14 1.14
RR17 1.05·107 3.3·107 2.7 ·107
0.021 0.066 0.54
RR53 1.44 · 107 25.35 · 107 207.2 · 107
0.029 0.509 4.16
RR57 2.1·107 32.5·107 265.7 ·107
0.042 0.652 5.33
RR73 1.31 · 107 1.65 · 107 13.5 ·107
0.0262 0.11 0.9
RR77 0.52·107 1.65·107 13.49·107
0.0105 0.033 0.27
Integrated 4.2 fb−1y−1 ≈ 36.7 fb−1y−1 ≈ 300 fb−1y−1
Luminosity
Table 6.1: Radiation levels past, present and future in comparison to the
annual integrated luminosity. The values of 2016 were extrapolated from a
set of data from the ﬁrst 6 months of the year and the remaining days of
beam time. The values for the HL-LHC phase were predicted using the data
from 2016 and the annual integrated luminosity that is the goal during the HL
phase.
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Chapter 7
Development of radiation-tolerant
systems
In areas with radiation, it is necessary to use electronic systems that have
been prepared for such an environment. Two diﬀerent ways to improve the
radiation tolerance of a design are explored in this work. One is to build a
system only from components whose radiation-tolerance is known and suf-
ﬁcient for the speciﬁc application. This method increases the tolerance of
the complete system against cumulative type damage and hard SEEs. The
other is to protect a system against soft SEEs with speciﬁc design and coding
techniques. The following sections will focus on discussing both methods in
detail. Furthermore, the importance of radiation tests to verify the radiation
tolerance of systems and single components will be explained. Guidelines and
proper procedure for radiation tests are presented at the end of this chapter.
7.1 Development and Protection Strategies
As discussed in chapter 5 there are two categories of damage radiation can
cause to electronic systems, cumulative damage (DD and TID) and stochas-
tic damage (SEEs). The vulnerability of existing devices with regard to
cumulative damage is dependent on their internal design and can therefore
not be improved further. In order to protect against this damage type, it is
necessary to choose hardware with high inherent radiation tolerance. Section
7.1.1 will give an overview of known radiation-tolerant technologies and the
general design rules for radiation-tolerant systems. The severity of stochastic
errors is heavily inﬂuenced by the choice of hardware. Also for stochastic er-
rors, it is possible to prevent or mask the inﬂuence of soft errors with certain
design and coding choices. The techniques that are able to mitigate SEEs
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are discussed in section 7.1.2.
7.1.1 Radiation-Tolerant Technologies
When radiation damage to electronics was ﬁrst recognized as a problem, it
was mostly focused on space applications. The high-energy radiation present
in space was known to cause degradation of semiconductor circuits and func-
tional disturbances due to SEEs. Today the eﬀects of radiation damage is a
problem that has to be taken into consideration even at sea level. The de-
crease in feature size due to Moore's law has led to a continuous decrease of
QCrit in all electronics systems. This is partially counteracted by the decrease
in the area that is used for charge collection, but the SER for electronics sys-
tems are constantly on the rise. For consumer electronics, this is generally
of low importance, but in the case of safety-critical applications it has to be
taken into consideration. Especially avionic systems that receive a higher
radiation load have to be protected. The radiation at sea level and in ﬂight
does not cause permanent damage to electronics due to cumulative damage.
Therefore cumulative damage is only a problem for areas with artiﬁcial ra-
diation ﬁelds like nuclear reactors and particle accelerators or outer space.
Before designing a radiation-tolerant system the type of hardware used has
to be selected. The three possible systems types are deﬁned as following:
 Commercials of the Shelf (COTS) are commercially available solutions
for a certain task. They range from single components like an ADC to
extensive systems like a ventilation system or an oxygen detector.
 Custom systems based on COTS are systems designed speciﬁcally de-
signed for a purpose with radiation-tolerance in mind. Their base
components are COTS that have been chosen for their above-average
radiation-tolerance.
 Radiation-Hardened Components are components or full systems that
were specially designed to withstand radiation by their manufacturer.
The usage of COTS saves the development time and cost necessary to
develop a custom solution. Therefore COTS are advantageous to use as long
as the project speciﬁcations allow them to be used. In case of the electronics
needs to be faster or more radiation tolerant, COTS cannot be used. COTS
systems are usually feature rich and come with some level of support by the
manufacturer. Their disadvantage is that their behavior under radiation is
unknown because they were not designed with radiation in mind. Most man-
ufacturers do not provide any information or oﬀer any support in concerning
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radiation-tolerance. Therefore to enable their usage in critical systems it
is mandatory to conduct irradiation campaigns to determine their radiation
tolerance. The goal is to determine their tolerance in regards to cumulative
damage and the existence of any occurring SEE error modes. The existence
of any hard SEEs usually prevents their usage in areas with radiation above
those at sea level. Assuming no such SEEs exist, a COTS system can be
used in areas around the accelerator that are considered radiation free. This
entails an environment where the annual ﬂuence of high-energy hadrons and
the annual TID is not higher than 106 cm−2y−1 and 10−3 Gy · y−1. This is
a radiation level comparable to the avionics level. Additionally, there are
several methods of system error mitigation that can be used to limit the in-
ﬂuence of soft SEEs. Remote resets of a system allow to remedy most eﬀects
of soft SEEs and hardware redundancy allows for a high availability of the
system.
In areas with a radiation level higher than the avionics level, COTS sys-
tems can no longer be used. In environments like this, the available solutions
are the usage of radiation-hardened systems or custom systems based on
COTS. Radiation hardened systems are designed especially for operation in
environments like outer space. Therefore they are highly resistant to cumu-
lative damage and have few or no SEE error modes. But due to the small
size of the market for such components, their price is usually several orders of
magnitude higher than those of comparable non-radiation hardened compo-
nents. The market size also limits the selection of available components. This
makes it diﬃcult to acquire all required components for a project as radiation
hardened. Custom Systems based on COTS are systems speciﬁcally designed
for a purpose and are made up of normal COTS components. Designing the
systems yourself allows for the introduction of hardware mitigation measures
to increase error tolerance. Furthermore a system designed for a speciﬁc pur-
pose can have a much higher reliability and speed than a COTS. All main
LHC systems include both COTS as well as custom designed electronics.
Some of the system, e.g. the experiments, were developed with radiation
tolerant or even radiation hard components. While COTS are not designed
to be radiation-tolerant, there exist large diﬀerences in radiation-tolerance
between otherwise comparable components. By using COTS with high radi-
ation tolerance, the resulting custom system will also have a high radiation
tolerance. Because the components are COTS the price of the whole system
remains low. As mentioned the manufacturers of COTS do not oﬀer any
information on the radiation tolerance of their products. Therefore it is nec-
essary to qualify all used components and the ﬁnal custom system using an
irradiation campaign. Figure 7.1 presents an overview of the radiation levels
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Figure 7.1: Relation between radiation level and usable system types. The
radiation levels are given in the three units that are related to the diﬀerent
types of radiation damage (High-energy hadron ﬂuence (cm−2y−1) for SEEs,
total ionizing dose (Gy y−1) for dose eﬀects and 1 MeV neutron equivalent
ﬂuence (cm−2y−1) for displacement damage). Radiation levels higher than
sea level can be separated into three levels of severity. In the lowest level,
electronic systems are usually only aﬀected by SEEs. COTS can be used if
mitigation measures are in place and the radiation is in the lower half of this
level. Using custom systems based on COTS is advisable to reduce the chance
of SEEs inﬂuencing the system. In the next level, the radiation is high enough
to cause cumulative damage to electronic systems. Custom systems that have
been qualiﬁed to withstand higher doses of TID and DD can still be used. In
the higher half of this level, the usage of radiation hardened components might
be necessary. In the ﬁnal level, the material of the electronic systems will
incur damage. Electronic systems in such an environment have to be replaced
in certain intervals. [42]
present in the LHC accelerator complex and the environments the diﬀerent
types of systems can operate in.
45
Field Programmable Gate Arrays
The centerpiece of many projects for digital signal processing and protection
systems are Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA). FPGAs are both
vulnerable to cumulative damage and SEEs. Especially the memory cells that
store the conﬁguration of the FPGA can become the critical point of failure.
SEUs changing the state of a memory cell in the conﬁguration memory would
change the algorithm running on the FPGA causing any number of possible
errors in the system. FPGAs can be separated into three categories by how
they store their conﬁguration.
 Anti-fuse FPGAs: FPGAs using this technology use anti-fuses to ﬁx
their programming permanently. Therefore they can be only pro-
grammed once, but are also immune to any radiation-induced changes
to their conﬁguration.
 SRAM-based FPGAs: Most FPGAs currently sold use SRAM cells to
store their conﬁguration. They have a higher gate density than other
technologies and lower prices compared to other technologies.
 Flash-based FPGAs: FPGAs that store their conﬁguration on ﬂash
cells make up only a small percentage of the market. Flash cells have
a high resistance against radiation
Anti-fuse technology loses some of the advantages of FPGAs to achieve
greater robustness with respect to radiation. During programming of an
Anti-fuse FPGA the unwanted connections of the interconnects are perma-
nently altered. Because it is missing the conﬁguration memory it is, therefore,
immune to the corruption of the algorithm due to radiation-induced SEUs.
Such a conﬁguration is non-volatile, eliminating the need for a reprogram-
ming of the FPGA after a power-cycle. The omission of an external storage
device and the on-board conﬁguration memory saves space both on the chip
and on the circuit board. The drawback of an Anti-fuse FPGA is that it
can only be programmed once. After that further algorithm changes are not
possible and would require an exchange of the FPGA. While the conﬁgura-
tion of an anti-fuse FPGA is immune to SEUs its logic cells are based on
SRAM technology. Therefore the combinatorial elements and registers that
form the algorithm are vulnerable to SEUs.
SRAM-based FPGAs are the most frequently used type of FPGA. They
utilize SRAM cells to store the conﬁguration of the FPGA. Because SRAM
cells are also used in many other electronics systems, FPGAs using them
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proﬁt from a large amount of research being done on them. Thanks to being
on the forefront of technology, they oﬀer the highest density of logic blocks.
A drawback is that their conﬁguration is volatile. Every time during activa-
tion of the system the conﬁguration data has to be re-sent from an external
device. Most of the time this will be an onboard ﬂash memory which takes
up additional space in the system. Therefore such an FPGA is not immedi-
ately available after power-up. Furthermore, all SRAM-based technology is
inherently vulnerable to data corruption by radiation. In the case of the con-
ﬁguration memory of an FPGA, an SEU would modify the interconnections
between the logic blocks. This would alter the function of the FPGA until
the conﬁguration is rewritten. Newer generations of FPGAs include dedi-
cated error correction measures to prevent the corruption of conﬁguration
memory. Furthermore, the decreasing feature size reduces the cross section
of critical SEEs [47]. In devices that do not require a 100% availability, it
is also possible to repair corruptions in the conﬁguration by reprogramming
the FPGA (Scrubbing). Newer generation FPGAs oﬀer several methods from
full reconﬁguration to partial reconﬁguration of only the aﬀected parts [48].
Flash-based FPGAs use ﬂash cells to store their conﬁguration. This gives
them an inherent immunity to SEUs, and their conﬁguration is non-volatile.
Due to less research being done on Flash FPGAs, they are 1-2 generations
behind SRAM technology. Furthermore, their size and power consumption
are considerably higher than their SRAM counterparts. Nevertheless, the
inherent immunity of ﬂash cells to SEUs is beneﬁcial for all projects were
radiation-tolerance is an issue. As with anti-fuse FPGAs, the immunity to
SEUs does not cover the logic cells of the FPGA. A ﬂash cell has a limit
how many times it can be programmed. Using them as registers for fast
calculations or similar tasks can quickly exhaust this limit. Because of this
and due to their lower speed they are unsuitable for the use in logic cells.
The high voltage required to erase the state of a ﬂash cell damages the oxide
layer between ﬂoating gate and the data line. Depending on the speciﬁc
ﬂash type after 100,000 to 1,000,000 write operations a ﬂash cell will cease
functioning. Therefore ﬂash FPGAs use SRAM technology as well for the
ﬂip-ﬂops of their logic cells.
7.1.2 Radiation-tolerant Design
The utilization of radiation-tolerant components while designing a system
can already increase its radiation tolerance to a high degree. Depending on
the radiation level in the area where the system will be installed, the danger
of cumulative damage might not be an issue. If all components have been
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qualiﬁed using irradiation campaigns and their dose and ﬂuence limit are
above the expected level reached during their operation time or lifetime, no
further action has to be taken. If the expected dose during the lifetime of
the system surpasses the dose limit, determined during the irradiation cam-
paign, measures have to be taken to replace the system before is fails. But
besides cumulative damage, it is usually not possible to completely remove
the chance of SEEs inﬂuencing a system. Therefore mitigation measures
have to included into a system to mask the eﬀects of any occurring SEEs. A
basic method of detecting and masking error in a system is redundancy. An
example would be reading out data from a memory element. Redundancy, in
this case, would be either reading the required data from diﬀerent addresses
of the same memory element or from several independent memory elements.
A voting logic then compares all read data with each other. By reading data
two times it is possible to detect a read error if the read samples do not
match. By reading data three times it is possible to determine the erroneous
read and mask it by transmitting the majority result. In the case of memory
elements like ﬂash cells which are immune to SEUs is also possible to use time
redundancy. This entails reading the data from the same memory element
three times after each other and comparing the result with a majority voter.
Redundancy is often used for FPGA algorithms. Triple modular redun-
dancy (TMR) is a common method to protect the logic cells of an FPGA
against SETs and SEUs. TMR creates three instances of every element of
the algorithm followed by a voter that compares the three results (see ﬁg.
7.2). As long as only one instance is faulty, the error is completely masked
and does not interfere with the operation of the system further downstream.
This technique is not perfect because there is a change of an SEU or SET
occurring simultaneously in two instances and the existence of the voter as a
single point of failure. Fortunately, the chance of a simultaneous occurrence
of identical errors is quite low, and the voter has due to its small and simple
structure a very good radiation tolerance. Other methods include protect-
ing memory elements (conﬁguration memory, block RAM or fabric memory)
with error correction codes (e.g. Hamming codes). Such correction methods
can ﬁx a single changed bit similar to TMR, but can only detect multiple
changed bits. Recent FPGAs have advanced this protection method for their
conﬁguration memory by protecting single bits from several data words with
one error correction code. This reduces the chance of unrecoverable errors
caused by one ionizing particle hitting to adjacent memory bits of one data
word.
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Figure 7.2: TMR triplicates every part of the original algorithm creating 3
independent instances. The results of the three instances are then evaluated
by a majority voter and the result with at least 2 votes gets passed on. If every
bit is stored in 3 places and every calculation is done 3 times, then a single SEU
cannot inﬂuence the result. The majority voter is still a vulnerable point, but
because its structure is both small and simple, its radiation resistance is usually
very good. Furthermore, an ion hitting two TMR parts is not impossible so
TMR can not completely prevent SEUs.
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7.2 Irradiation Campaigns
7.2.1 Motivation for Irradiation Campaigns
As explained in chapters 6 and 7, many electronic systems of the LHC will
operate in environments with a radiation level higher than sea level. Some
areas are shielded enough to allow the usage of COTS systems. Other areas
will require custom systems based on COTS and radiation hardened systems.
In all cases it is required to know how a system will operate in the environ-
ment it will be used in. In the case of radiation hardened components, the
manufacturer provides information about the tolerance of the components
against one speciﬁc radiation ﬁeld. This information might not be compara-
ble to the radiation ﬁeld the system will operate in. Therefore in most cases,
it is required to launch an irradiation campaign to quantify the radiation
tolerance of those systems. To design a custom system based on COTS it
is required to have information about the radiation tolerance of the required
components. Though COTS are not designed for radiation tolerance, irradi-
ation campaigns have shown big diﬀerences in the tolerance of two otherwise
comparable components. While certain design features of components like
high resistance to thermal inﬂuence or electric noise can hint at a higher
radiation tolerance it is principally impossible to determine their radiation-
tolerance without an irradiation campaign. Therefore frequent irradiation
campaigns are necessary to acquire knowledge about components that can
be used to design custom systems. The qualiﬁcation of every system needs
to be investigated before introduction into the accelerator.
7.2.2 Procedures of Irradiation Campaigns
The goal of an irradiation campaign is to understand how a component acts
when subjected to radiation. This can be separated into its reaction to cumu-
lative damage (total ionizing dose and displacement damage) and SEEs. For
cumulative damage, its is necessary to determine how the electrical parame-
ters of a device change in accordance with the increase in dose and neutron
equivalent ﬂuence. Depending on the device some may even break down after
a certain dose. In this case the speciﬁcs of the breakdown and in which ﬁnal
state the component remains is interesting. The level of dose and ﬂuence
that is still acceptable depends on the target project speciﬁcations because
requirement can vary greatly. For SEEs the target is to ﬁnd all types of
SEEs occurring and calculate cross sections for every type. A special focus is
on ﬁnding any hard SEEs which would usually preclude a component from
being used in an irradiated environment.
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Irradiation campaigns acquire this information by irradiating the target com-
ponent and monitoring its behavior. Due to the insuﬃcient knowledge about
the manufacturing process of most components, an in-depth analysis of the
inﬂuence of radiation on speciﬁc layers of a component is very diﬃcult.
Therefore radiation tests monitor as many key values as possible during ir-
radiation to try to gain understanding on the state of the component. The
key values that are measured depend heavily on the type of component. In
most cases, power consumption can provide valuable information about any
changes in the component, and it reacts strongly in the case of a breakdown.
Other examples for monitoring values are the gain and the forward threshold
voltage of an ampliﬁer and the on-state resistance and output voltage of a
photoMOS. Depending on the type of component there will be other values
that are interesting to measure.
The search of SEEs is signiﬁcantly more complicated because they can alter
the behavior of any part of a component. Destructive SEEs like SEL, SEB
and SEGR are usually detected by measuring the current consumption. SE-
FIs are interrupts of the function of the device, so depending on the device,
its operation has to be closely monitored to detect such interrupts. SEUs,
and to a lesser degree, SETs can alter the state of bits in a device. In the
case of a memory device, such alterations can be detected by writing a known
pattern on the device and reading it out several times. SEUs and SETs can
be found by comparing the read-out pattern with the one that was writ-
ten onto the memory elements. Any changed bits would be the eﬀects of an
SEE. Such deviations from the pattern may even occur for ﬂash cells that are
immune to SEUs. Those are caused via inﬂuencing the read-out electronic
producing an altered result. Data alterations can also occur if the component
in question is a data transmitting device like an ADC. Data alterations can
take the form of a single altered bit in a data word, but, depending on the
inner workings of the component, it could also lead to a greater number of
altered bits and data words. Again, this is detected by transmitting a known
pattern and comparing the results.
Setup of an Irradiation Campaign
During the irradiation campaigns of this project, the device under test (DUT)
was usually mounted on a special circuit board designed for testing. Exam-
ples for such circuit boards are shown in chapter 8. For eﬃciency reasons
more than one DUT is usually tested during one time-slot at a test facility
(test facilities are described in 7.2.2). To allow for the easy testing of several
DUTs each was mounted on an adapter board that was connected to a base
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board during irradiation. While the adapter board contains the DUT and
any peripherals unique to this DUT the base board handles the power supply
and communication of data. The baseboard also contains an FPGA which
allows for additional conﬁguration options during testing, handles the com-
munication with the user control system, the data acquisition and provides
any required input signals for the DUT. Due to the failure modes of a device
being unknown before the test, it is required to acquire as many data about
the device behavior as possible. This allows for an easier understanding of
the behavior of the device under radiation after the analysis of the acquired
data. Special care has to be applied to the data readout system. Usually,
during the irradiation of a component, all readout electronics is positioned,
depending on the irradiation facility, 20-30 meters away from the component.
For digital data, this poses a problem because many typical transfer proto-
cols like SPI/I2C can not be used over that distance. Electronic components
that translate these protocols into those that exhibit a larger range of trans-
mission like Ethernet, in turn, are vulnerable to radiation and can therefore
not be used safely. Possible solutions for this problem are either to shield
the vulnerable electronic systems or to use a transfer method that is tolerant
against radiation. More details about data transmission can be found in the
chapters detailing the irradiation campaigns that are part of this project.
Methodology of Irradiation Campaigns
Knowing the behavior of a component under radiation is necessary to use it
for radiation-tolerant projects. Unfortunately, data about this behavior can
easily become obsolete. The radiation tolerance may vary substantially even
for one speciﬁc component if it was produced using diﬀerent manufacturing
processes or at a diﬀerent manufacturing site. Furthermore, manufacturers
may produce newer revisions of a component using diﬀerent methods which
could also greatly inﬂuence the radiation tolerance. Such changes are usually
not published, which can lead to unexpected failures of radiation-tolerant
equipment. In order to avoid such failures, radiation tests should be con-
ducted before and in parallel with the development of a system. Figure 7.3
shows how the design of a system and the irradiation tests should optimally
be interleaved.
Concerning the choice of the type of radiation for the irradiation, there
are two methods for testing, using a mono-particle beam (one type of particle
at a speciﬁc energy level) and using a mixed radiation ﬁeld (a wide variety
of particles of diﬀerent energies). Mono particle beams have the advantage
that they are more easily available. Testing facilities that can provide access
to such a beam are discussed further in the next paragraph. Mono parti-
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Figure 7.3: In order to take new revisions of a component and other changes
of a component in consideration several irradiation campaigns should be con-
ducted during development of the full system. If an adequate component for a
project has been found, there should be an initial irradiation campaign testing
a small sample of the target component. If the radiation-tolerance has been
veriﬁed, a large batch (enough to last for the full project) should be bought.
Sometimes, depending on the relation to the manufacturer it is possible to ac-
quire the components from a single production batch which helps with keeping
the tolerance levels equal. Following the initial irradiation test, it should be
repeated with a sample from the large batch to account for possible changes in
the time between both tests. If the available time for development is to short
then the initial step can be omitted. In any case any large batches that are
deemed unusable for radiation-tolerant projects can be utilized for systems in
radiation free environments.
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cle beams are especially preferable if the information required is focused on
one type of radiation eﬀects. A radiation ﬁeld of gamma particles is the
most easily available(usually produced by a 60Co-source) and can be used
to test for TID eﬀects. Neutron beams can be used for DD eﬀects and syn-
chrotrons/cyclotrons providing a proton beam are best for testing for SEEs.
A disadvantage of tests in mono-particle beam facilities is that the provided
radiation is very diﬀerent from the environment close to the LHC. The much
wider energy range of radiation in the vicinity of the accelerator and a large
number of occurring particles make this environment signiﬁcantly more harm-
ful for electronic components. Therefore the results of mono-particle beams
have to be adjusted by a safety margin to account for the diﬀerence between
test and real environment. Irradiation tests using mixed ﬁeld are far more
realistic, but there are signiﬁcantly fewer facilities where such tests can be
conducted than for mono-particle tests.
Testing Facilities
There are several external facilities that can provide a mono-particle beam
for irradiation campaigns. Table 7.1 list some of them together with the
beam type they can provide.
Facility Beam Type
Fraunhofer INT Gammas
Neutrons
Paul-Scherrer Institute (PSI) Protons
European Space Agency Gammas
Centre Energie Atomique (CEA) Neutrons
Table 7.1: Facilities that can provide a mono particle beam for irradiation
campaigns.
Most irradiation campaigns for this project were carried out at the Paul
Scherrer Institute (PSI) Proton Irradiation Facility (PIF) (see ﬁg. 7.4) in
Switzerland [49] [50]. The initial proton beam for PIF is delivered from
the COMET cyclotron with the help of the primary energy degrader, which
allows setting a few discrete initial beam energies in the range from 200
MeV down to 30 MeV. The beam is subsequently guided to the experimental
area, where PIF is located. A further set of energy degraders is placed
before the DUT to set a lower energy. For all conducted tests, the primary
energy was set to 200 MeV. Beam particles with higher energy create more
secondary ionizing particles and therefore produce more free charge carriers
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in the material. Below a threshold of about 20 MeV, SEEs are usually not
observable. Therefore all irradiation campaigns were conducted using the
highest beam energy available. As mentioned the radiation ﬁeld of the LHC
contains protons with energies in the GeV range. In the RR sections (see
chap. 6) which are most relevant for this work about 10% of all particles
have energies above 690 MeV and 1% have energies above 2.8 GeV. The
interaction cross section of high-Z materials like tungsten and hafnium does
not saturate at energies of 200 MeV. Therefore, particles with energies higher
than 200 MeV produce more secondary particles leading to an increased SEE
rate. Cross section measurements at PSI will, therefore, produce results that
are lower than comparable measurement in a more realistic radiation ﬁeld.
Simulations have calculated that a safety margin of 2 has to be applied to
results from PSI test to account for high energy particles [42]. The typical
ﬂux of the PSI beam is about 1.7·108 p · s−1· cm−2. This high ﬂux allows for
accelerated tests where the ﬂuence of several years can be achieved in hours.
The total integrated dose and ﬂuence are provided by the facility. Figure 7.4
shows the PIF testing site. By removing the circular collimator at the end
of the beam line, the radius of the beam can be increased to a level allowing
the irradiation of a whole circuit board. Systems bigger than about 10 cm
cannot be tested at PSI.
Facilities that enable mix ﬁeld irradiation campaigns with similar environ-
ments to the LHC vicinity are not readily available. Furthermore, sometimes
there is a need to test larger systems with a volume that cannot be tested
in most external facilities. Therefore CERN has put continuous eﬀort into
providing a testing facility at CERN that allows both for large volume test-
ing and testing in a realistic environment. The ﬁrst testing facility of this
type was CNRAD. In 2007 the gallery close to the CNGS neutrino target
was cleared from electronic equipment due to the intense radiation showers
produced by the fast extraction of the SPS beam. After installing radiation
monitors this gallery could be used for irradiation tests. It provided a HEH
ﬂux between 2·1010-2·1011 cm−2 per week and a dose between 3-30 Gy per
week. CNRAD was able to reproduce the energy spectrum of the shielded
areas as they exist in the LHC tunnel. The ﬂux could be varied by chang-
ing the distance from the collision target. Furthermore, the radiation ﬁeld
produced by hitting a target with the primary proton beam could be used
to test for all three interactions of radiation with electronic systems. The
disadvantage of CNRAD was that it was purely a parasitic test site to the
CNGS experiment. Access was only possible during the few stops of the ex-
periment. Furthermore, the control of irradiation campaigns has to be placed
in the CNGS control room leading to cable lengths of 1 km. Therefore CN-
RAD could not be a ﬁnal solution and was closed in 2012.
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Figure 7.4: Top: Schematic of the Proton Irradiation Facility at PSI. Bottom:
Irradiation site of PIF.
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Because previous mixed-ﬁeld irradiation facilities at CERN hat several
disadvantages, the dedicated irradiation CHARM (Cern High-energy Accel-
eRator Mixed ﬁeld/facility) site was designed and was commissioned at the
end of 2014. CHARM is not only able to reproduce the radiation ﬁeld oc-
curring in the vicinity of the LHC but also several atmospheric and space
environments. Furthermore, the test site is big enough to house whole accel-
erator control systems or parts of airplanes and cars.
Inside the CHARM irradiation area (see ﬁg. 7.5) a 24 GeV proton beam
hits a target, and the produced secondary radiation scatters through the
whole room. By changing the target material, choosing a speciﬁc test posi-
tion and extending up to 4 movable shields it is possible to create a wider
variety of radiation ﬁeld. The ﬂux CHARM can produce reaches between
107 and 1012 n
cm2·s . Test setups are brought inside the test facility using a
remote handling to limit radiation exposure of the users. Because the mixed
radiation ﬁeld is close to the real radiation conditions at the LHC, no safety
margins have to be applied to the results.
7.2.3 Irradiation Campaign Guide
An irradiation campaign is a complex process requiring a multitude of choices
to be made ahead of the testing. Failures in planning can hinder the success
of the project. The following section is meant as a collection of advice to
help circumvent some of the most common problems.
The adapter board with the DUT, the baseboard, all cable connections be-
tween user control and test setup and the test algorithm running on the
FPGA on the baseboard have to be designed precisely to ensure that all nec-
essary properties of the DUT are measured. Most of these components can
be tested by replicating the test setup in a lab and conducting a dry-run of
the whole irradiation campaign. Special care should be taken to verify that
the cable connections and all communication protocols passing them can op-
erate over a distance of up to 30 meters.
The user control for the test should be made simple to operate. Testing
conditions (length and time of day) tend to be not optimal so an easy to use
system helps to prevent mishaps due to diﬃcult conditions. Furthermore,
time slots for irradiation campaigns are fairly limited so retesting due to a
failed ﬁrst test might not be possible.
The user control and data acquisition usually runs on a PC that is connected
by cable to the test setup. For creating this software most programming
languages are possible options as long as they support the necessary commu-
nication interfaces to the test setup. LabView is a tool that can be used
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Figure 7.5: (Top left): CHARM irradiation chamber 18 positions, 4 shield
layers and diﬀerent target materials allow the production of varied radiation
ﬁelds. (Top right and bottom): Diﬀerent perspectives on the CHARM instal-
lation.
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for creating both a control and a data acquisition interface. LabView al-
lows creating programs very quickly by oﬀering pre-made functions for most
interfaces. During this work LabView was used for both control and data-
acquisition. As an end result LabView was deemed suitable for those tasks
unless the data-rate to be acquired is too high. To account for data rates in
the range of MBaud future irradiation campaigns will use a data-acquisition
written in Python.
While creating a format for the data that is acquired from the DUT, it is
important to include reliable time stamps. Because the data about the ra-
diation level is supplied by the testing facility, is necessary to relate both
sets of data with each other. Absolute timestamps are preferred against time
stamps relative to the start of a test to avoid possible confusion.
Depending on the type of irradiation campaign the requirements for the user
control diﬀer. A test with a high radiation ﬂux, like it can be conducted at
PSI, can be ﬁnished in a few hours. Therefore personal supervision of the
test is possible during the whole test. In this case, the user control can proﬁt
from a multitude of indicators indicating the state of the measurement and
in the case of problems the possibility to reconﬁgure the test to ﬁx prob-
lems. In the case of a test with lower ﬂux, like at CHARM, where the test
takes a whole week of continuous irradiation, the whole test setup requires
the ability to operate without the user. Still, the user needs to have the
ability to check upon the test state regularly. This includes the ability to
reset the test remotely. Manual control of the test hardware is usually not
possible during tests at CHARM. Besides data acquired from test modules
like ADCs or ﬂash cells, it is helpful to log as many additional signals that
can give an understanding about the state of the DUT. After a successful
irradiation campaign, all data has to be combined and evaluated to catego-
rize the DUT's behavior under radiation. For the evaluation of data samples
LabView is again a useful tool. In the case of high amounts of data (>100
MByte) LabView loses most advantages due to the eﬀort required to opti-
mize the project to be able to analyze such an amount of data in acceptable
time. In such cases, a self-written program in a language of choice might be
more advantageous.
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Chapter 8
Development of a new 600 A
quench detection system
8.1 State of the previous QDS System
The previous QDS system is structured as described in section 4.2.3. The
circuit board used in this system (see ﬁg. 8.1) is equipped with a digital
signal processor (DSP) implementing the QDS algorithm.
Figure 8.1: Circuit board of the previous 600 A QDS system(10x20 cm)
During the initial development of the quench detection electronics, it was
assumed that there would be hardly any radiation at the location of the
electronics. Therefore no protection measured are included into the design.
Especially the DSP, which is based on code-execution from SRAM cells,
is highly vulnerable to SEUs. In 2012 the previous system produced 16
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errors that could be traced back to radiation eﬀects. Using the ﬂuence data
from 2015 (see section 6), one can extrapolate that during the HL-LHC
phase of the experiment the previous system would produce about 70 errors
every year. Under such a condition the availability requirements for HL-
LHC cannot be fulﬁlled. Therefore a new system has to be designed that can
operate under the expected levels of HEH ﬂuence.
8.2 Requirements for the new QDS System
Chapter 2.2 described the requirements on the availability of the whole sys-
tem for the HL-LHC phase. The limits for premature beam aborts and down-
time of the individual systems making up the LHC (QPS, cryogenics, power
converters vacuum and others) are given in [10]. The whole QPS system has
a radiation error budget of nine faults that force a beam dump every year.
A generally agreed target during the development of the new 600 A QDS
system was to limit radiation-induced errors at a maximum of 2 annually for
the full system. The new QDS system was installed beginning 2016 in all
locations where problematic radiation levels are to be expected (see ﬁg. 6.1).
About 200 circuit boards were used to replace the previous system in these
locations. For an average HL-LHC HEH ﬂuence of 6 · 108cm−2 this would
require an error cross section of less than 3.3 · 10−9cm2 for the full system.
Furthermore, even though the annual TID in the shielded RR sections even
during HL-LHC is not very high, all components should have a TID limit
of several hundred Gy to preclude any possible trouble due to cumulative
damage.
8.3 Design of the new System
During the start of this work, the new circuit board was already in the later
stages of development. The new system still retains the quench detection
method of the previous system. But to increase the radiation-tolerance all
used components were such whose radiation-tolerances were already known
or would be tested in the scope of this work. The ﬁrst important step for
increasing the radiation-tolerance was to replace the DSP by a ﬂash-based
FPGA from Microsemi. The ProAsic3 is an FPGA based on ﬂash tech-
nology that had shown high radiation tolerance in tests [51] and was already
part of many radiation-tolerant systems at CERN. The usage of ﬂash cells
means that the conﬁguration of the FPGA is secure, while the fabric ﬂip-
ﬂops can be protected using TMR.
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The new circuit board also featured the AT25DF041A Flash Memory, the
AQW210EHA PhotoMOS and the ADUM3402 digital isolator whose irradi-
ation campaigns are discussed in later chapters. Another important compo-
nent of the new system was a radiation-tolerant high-resolution ADC. The
used quench detection method requires high-resolution measurement of volt-
age and current over the magnet circuit because bigger step sizes in their
signal could easily lead to large spikes in the derived signal (see Eq. 4.1).
Such spikes can produce results higher than the voltage threshold and trigger
the QDS logic. The ADS1281 [52] was chosen for this project because there
existed already encouraging results from two previous irradiation campaigns
[53][54]. It comprises a ∆Σ-Modulator, a programmable ﬁlter composed of a
Sinc ﬁlter and four Finite Impulse Response (FIR) ﬁlters, a calibration block
and a serial interface for communication with the rest of the system (see ﬁg.
8.2).
Figure 8.2: Building blocks of the ADS1281
The ﬁrst irradiation campaign was conducted at the H4IRRAD facility,
a mixed ﬁeld test site at CERN [55], while the second was conducted us-
ing the proton beam at the PSI [49]. In the ﬁrst test at H4IRRAD [53],
the ADC was stimulated by a test signal. The output of the ∆Σ-modulator
was monitored for SEUs in the bit stream, bypassing the digital ﬁlter block.
Furthermore, the power consumption was measured to search for SELs. No
SEUs or SELs were found during the measurement. Therefore the cross sec-
tions for these events cannot be high enough to result in a full event when
multiplied with the ﬂuence. From this the upper limits for the cross sections
of both error modes could be determined as σSEL < 8.06 · 10−13 cm2/device
and σSEU < 1.31 · 10−12 cm2/device.
The second irradiation campaign [54] searched further for SELs. Moreover,
the modulator output stream was monitored for breaks in the stream (single-
event functional interrupts; SEFIs). No SELs were detected. The cross sec-
tion for SEFIs was calculated to be σSEFI = 9.38 · 10−13 cm2/device.
Due to the cross sections of all detected error modes being low, the ADS1281
was a suitable candidate for the 600 A QDS system. But the previous tests
focused only on the ∆Σ-modulator while omitting the other blocks. During
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usage as part of the 600 A QDS, these blocks would not be bypassed. There-
fore additional irradiation campaigns were required to analyze their behavior
and ﬁnd any additional error failure modes.
8.4 Irradiation Campaigns on the ADS1281
8.4.1 Setup of the ﬁrst campaign
The ﬁrst irradiation campaign on the ADS1281 was conducted at PSI. The
test hardware used during the campaign comprises a small circuit board with
two ADCs and all required peripherals and a baseboard. During the irradia-
tion, the board housing the DUTs is attached to the baseboard. This modular
approach was chosen to enable testing multiple instances of a DUT without
replacing the baseboard. The baseboard provided the necessary peripherals
for data acquisition and communication to the controlling computer.
Figure 8.3: The baseboard is equipped with a radiation-tolerant FPGA run-
ning the necessary algorithms for data acquisition from the DUT and communi-
cation with the rest of the test setup. Conﬁguration from and data transmission
to the controlling computer are transmitted via an I2C data line.
The baseboard was equipped with a Microsemi ProAsic3 FPGA which
houses the necessary algorithms for providing stimulus data to the DUTs.
The acquisition of data was done using a self-written module also running
on the FPGA which used a combined I2C/Ethernet data line to connect to
a PC in the control room (see ﬁg. 8.4). This PC connected to this data line
using a self-written LabView control and data acquisition program. The
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FPGA on the baseboard would also receive a certain amount of radiation
during the irradiation campaign so the usage of a ﬂash-based FPGA with
high tolerance was required. The algorithm on the FPGA was protected
with TMR to prevent radiation-induced errors in the SRAM-based logic el-
ements of the FPGA.
Figure 8.4: To protect most instruments from radiation only the DUT and
the necessary I2C to USB and USB to Ethernet converter are inside the
beam chamber. The beam was collimated to limit radiation exposure of the
baseboard excluding the area of the DUTs. The stimulus signal for the DUT
and the power supply are both provided from the radiation free control room.
A LabView program is used to store the data acquired via the Ethernet data
line.
During irradiation, the ADC was stimulated with a slow low-amplitude
sine wave. The ADC sampled the stimulus signal with a frequency of 2 kHz
(due to usage of pin-mode the highest value available), and the resulting data
stream was fully acquired and stored for later analysis.
8.4.2 Results of the ﬁrst irradiation campaign
Two ADCs were irradiated with a TID of 300 Gy. Until the end, none of
the two ADCs experienced a functional breakdown. Unfortunately during
this measurement the LabView data-acquisition produced several critical
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errors, leading to complete data loss for many of the irradiation phases. These
errors were most likely due to radiation-induced errors in either master (the
I2C to ethernet adapter) or slave (the test board) of the I2C connection
inside the beam chamber. The I2C protocol allows for states were both
master and slave wait for a response from each other. Normally unreachable,
such states can occur if either master or slave is switched to a diﬀerent state
due to an SEU in the state register. Only data during irradiation with a
TID of about 120 Gy was collected, which was deemed too small a sample
for a proper statistical analysis. In a qualitative analysis of the data, three
distinct error modes were found inside the ADC output signal.
In 28 cases the ADC signal showed single samples with vastly diﬀerent values
than the surrounding samples. These δ-function-like errors ranged from small
to maximum signal amplitude spikes in both directions.
Second most frequently with twelve detected events were multi-sample errors
as shown in ﬁgure 8.5. These errors also ranged from small to full signal
amplitude. Their width remained fairly constant with a length of 40-50
samples.
Figure 8.5: Example for one of the twelve multi-sample errors from the ﬁrst
irradiation campaign. Their average length was between 40-50 samples.
Least frequently with only six detected events were temporary stops in the
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Figure 8.6: Example for a temporary stop of the ADC data ﬂow. Five similar
events were detected during the irradiation campaign. The average length of
these stops were 64 samples with a spread of ±3 samples
data stream produced by the ADC. One of the ADCs would stop producing
new samples and restart is function after 32 milliseconds (64 samples with a
sampling frequency of 2 kHz, see ﬁg. 8.6).
8.4.3 Conclusions from the ﬁrst irradiation campaign
The ﬁrst irradiation campaign on the ADS1281 was a partial success. It
could be determined that the ADC was able to withstand a TID of about
300 Gy without functional breakdown. This conﬁrmed the results of a pre-
vious test and the amount of dose tolerance is suﬃcient for QDS projects.
Several failure modes were discovered in the behavior of the ADC under radi-
ation which would prove critical for a component of the QDS. Furthermore,
the radiation vulnerability of the data acquisition leads to an insuﬃcient
data sample being collected. Therefore, to acquire enough data to be able
to calculate statistical sound cross sections for the failure modes, a second
irradiation campaign would be necessary. To that end, the data acquisition
had to be revised to prevent the loss of data due to irradiation.
8.4.4 Setup of the second irradiation campaign
While it was not possible to calculate meaningful cross sections due to the
insuﬃcient amount of data the observed failure modes would be critical for
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Figure 8.7: This is the version of the 600 A QDS board used during the
second irradiation campaign (22*10 cm). The red circle shows the approximate
dimension of the collimated beam used in most of the tests.
the QDS system. Therefore it was necessary to conduct a second campaign
to acquire more data about those failure modes and search for any other
that were overlooked due to the insuﬃcient amount of data. Furthermore,
several problems had to be solved ﬁrst before conducting a second irradiation
campaign on the ADC. In the previous campaign, only a small part of the
necessary amount of data was acquired due to serious failings of the data
acquisition system. The most probable source of these errors was the radi-
ation vulnerability of the I2Cs data-line. Therefore parallel to the I2Cs
line, which would still be used for conﬁguration of the device, a dedicated
SPI data readout line was created. Furthermore, this campaign was also
used to test the prototype of mitigation measures against the failure modes
discovered during the ﬁrst campaign (see chap. 8.5.2).
The second irradiation campaign was also conducted at PSI 7.2.2. Instead
of a dedicated test board, the current version of the 600 A QDS board was
chosen as a DUT. This would allow for a test of the whole system instead
of only the ADC. The 600 A QDS board is equipped with two ADCs and a
Microsemi ProAsic3 FPGA. Due to the radiation tolerance of the FPGA,
it was possible to use the uncollimated beam, for some of the irradiation
steps, to test the rest of the board for unexpected vulnerability to radiation.
The setup for this second irradiation campaign was similar to the ﬁrst
one. Instead of one data line handling both data acquisition and conﬁgura-
tion two dedicated data lines were used. The I2C data-line failures only
occurred during data acquisition at high data rates so using it solely for the
conﬁguration of the FPGA was possible. Using the SPI new data line a
vector containing 13 bytes of data was transmitted. 12 of these bytes were
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Figure 8.8: Schematic representation of the setup of the electronics for the
second irradiation campaign. Data and conﬁguration line have been split to
increase the stability of data acquisition. Furthermore, besides the previously
used sine-wave generator, for stimulus signals a generator producing close-to-
real magnet signals was included. These magnet signals mimic the behavior of
voltage and current inside a magnet for a normal accelerator cycle and allow
for realistic stimulus signals.
used to transmit four three-byte signals containing either raw data from both
FPGAs, the ﬁnal voltage URes (see eq. 4.1) and several intermediate signals
from stages of the calculation and the mitigation measures. The last byte
was used to transmit several ﬂags providing information about the state of
the algorithm. The transmission happened in bursts of a high number of
these vectors instead of a continuous transmission. Between data bursts, the
produced data was stored in several TMR-protected FIFOs on the FPGA.
The general throughput was high enough to read out all data produced by
the ADC running at a sampling frequency of 2 kHz.
During irradiation the ADCs were stimulated with two types of signals, a
slow sine wave like during the ﬁrst irradiation campaign and simulated mag-
net ramps that mimic voltage and current behavior during an accelerator
cycle.
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8.4.5 Results from the second irradiation campaign
During this irradiation campaign, the new data-acquisition performed with-
out any problems. Data during a total dose of 3378 Gy of irradiation was
acquired. This data was collected over the irradiation of three DUTs with
a total of six ADCs. The three DUTs were irradiated with 650, 628 and
640 Gy respectively. During irradiation with a dose of 1898 Gy the ADC
was stimulated with a sine wave and during 1480 Gy with the simulated
magnet ramps.
Besides veriﬁcation of the previous results, the campaign also focused on the
eﬀect of cumulative damage on the ADC. To evaluate the changing behavior
of the ADC with increasing dose, the acquired data was ﬁrst searched for drift
in the signal level. The position of the peaks of the stimulating sine function
in parts of the campaign was measured, and the resulting plot can be seen
in ﬁgures 8.9 and 8.10. Due to changes in the setup between measurements,
some data sets had a diﬀerent oﬀset and were removed from this ﬁgure. As
can be seen, both the maximum and minimum show a distinct drift down-
wards starting from a dose of about 250-300 Gy. For most applications in
the QDS, a dose budget of 250 Gy is more than suﬃcient due to annual doses
usually being not higher than 10 Gy. Furthermore, the signal measured (a
±100 mV sine wave) had a maximum range of ±10 V, whereby the signal
only drifts by 0.002% of this range. This is more than the maximum error
from the speciﬁcations of 200 µV, but holds no consequence for the 600 A
quench detector.
The measurement of current consumption of the device alone was not
possible during these tests because the full QDS board for the 600 A mag-
nets was used as a test board. The small current consumption of the ADCs
and any possible drift would be too small in comparison to the current con-
sumption of the entire board.
Besides measuring the signal drift, the data was again searched for any distor-
tions in the signal and any other possible error modes of the data acquisition.
Figure 8.11 shows one of the measurements where the stimulus signal was
a magnet ramp. The many distortions here are mainly single-sample errors
with a few multi-sample errors.
53 ADC stops were also found in the data. The higher amount of data as
compared to the ﬁrst irradiation campaign allowed getting a clearer picture
of the length distribution of the stops. Table 8.1 shows the number of stops
in relation to their length. It is clear that besides some aberrants the stop
length is fairly ﬁxed around 62 samples.
Table 8.2 shows the cross sections of all failure modes, the amount of
counted failures and the size of the data sample used to calculate the mea-
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Figure 8.9: Drift of the maximum value of a measured sine wave during
irradiation for both ADCs. The red lines are polynomial ﬁts to the data.
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Figure 8.10: Drift of the minimum value of a measured sine wave during
irradiation for both ADCs. The red lines are polynomial ﬁts to the data.
sured in HEH ﬂuence that passed the DUT during acquisition. During this
campaign, a fourth failure mode was discovered. Two times during the irra-
diation the gain of a signal increased signiﬁcantly (see ﬁg. 8.12). This change
persisted until a restart of the ADC.
Unmitigated all of these failure modes would trigger the quench protection
70
Figure 8.11: ADC output signal during irradiation while being stimulated
with a simulated magnet signal. The stimulus signal is a 19-minute long sim-
ulated magnet ramp. The measured signal is distorted in many places due to
radiation errors. Most distortions of the signal are only one sample wide while
some span over multiple consecutive samples.
Stop Length in Samples Qty. of Stops
59-66 29
32 2
≈ 100 2
≈ 105 2
Table 8.1: Distribution of the lengths of stops observed during irradiation
of the ADC. Most stop lengths were inside a narrow area between 59 and 66
samples while a few aberrant were observed with a length up to 105.
logic leading to a beam abort. According to the radiation levels shown in
chapter 6 and with a system comprising 400 ADCs, these failure cross sections
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Figure 8.12: Permanent change of the signal gain.
Qty. Errors Fluence Cross section
in cm2/Device
Single-sample errors 191 1.85± 0.09 · 1012 1.03± 0.05 · 10−10
Multi-sample errors 97 1.85± 0.09 · 1012 5.24± 0.03 · 10−11
ADC Stops 35 6.24± 0.31 · 1012 5.60± 0.28 · 10−12
Gain Jumps 2 6.24± 0.31 · 1012 3.20± 0.16 · 10−13
Combined 1.61± 0.05 · 10−10
Table 8.2: Error cross sections of all discovered error modes. ADC stops and
and gain jumps are based on a higher amount of ﬂuence due to the possibility
to ﬁnd them in the data set collected with magnet ramps as stimulus. Single
and multi-sample errors could only be detected in the data sample produced
with a sine wave as stimulus.
would cause a signiﬁcant amount of beam aborts every year. A calculation
using an average of the radiation levels given in table 6.1 predicts about one
failure every year for 2015, about 8 during 2016 and during the HL-LHC
phase about 60 failures every year. Failure rates this high would negatively
impact the overall availability of the accelerator and limit the integrated
luminosity that can be achieved. Therefore a dedicated mitigation system is
required to limit the impact of those failures to an acceptable level.
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8.5 Failure mitigation
8.5.1 Failure analysis
To design a mitigation system for all discovered failure modes, it is necessary
to understand how they occur. Because none of the failures occur outside of
radiation it should be possible to trace all of them back to radiation. The
observed drift of the signal (see ﬁgs. 8.9 and 8.10) is clearly an eﬀect of
cumulative damage which can not be mitigated. All other failure modes
are singular events only lasting a short amount of time. Therefore they
most likely stem from SEEs in one of the functional blocks seen in ﬁgure
8.2. Among the four failure modes discovered single-sample errors were the
easiest to be understood. The output of the delta-sigma modulator of the
ADC is a bit stream that is converted into a data word by the sinc-ﬁlter
block. This data word is then further transmitted downstream through the
ADC undergoing several operations in the other ADC blocks. Between the
diﬀerent functional blocks, the data word is stored in SRAM output registers.
An SEU ﬂipping the value of one of the bits in the data word would change
the value of the data word and produce a short spike in a stream of otherwise
continuous values. Therefore it can be concluded that single-sample errors
are the product of SEUs in the data word in positions of the ADC downstream
of the ﬁltering block.
Multi-sample errors are closely related to single-sample errors due to their
origin being SEUs as well. Digital Finite Impulse Response (FIR) ﬁlter like
those used in this ADC will upon stimulation by a δ-function-like signal
output their ﬁlter kernel. An SEU switching one bit of a data word produces
a signal very similar to the δ-function. The analysis of multi-sample errors
showed a clear similarity between the most common form of those errors and
the kernels of the four-stage FIR ﬁlter of the ADC. Figure 8.13 shows the
4 kernels (available from the data sheet [52]), although the ﬁrst one is not
visible due to its low amplitude. Therefore it is very likely that multi-sample
errors are created by a superposition of the ﬁlter kernels of the ADC after
stimulation by a δ-pulse created through an SEU.
To verify this theory the FIR ﬁlter stage was simulated using LabViewas
a four-step FIR ﬁlter using the kernels from the datasheet. Using this sim-
ulation artiﬁcial SEUs were induced in the stages before the FIR ﬁlters and
their transformation were observed. Figure 8.14 shows a comparison between
a measured multi-sample error and one produced by simulation. The simi-
larity between both curves suggests the plausibility of the theory. A deﬁnite
proof is unfortunately not possible because the inner functionality of the
ADC was not made public.
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Figure 8.13: Filter kernel used in the ADC to reduce unwanted high frequen-
cies. The ﬁrst kernel has an amplitude too low to be visible next to the other
three.
Figure 8.14: Comparison between a simulated multi-sample error and a mea-
sured one. The red curve was created by replicating the ADC FIR ﬁlter stages
using LabView. This ﬁlter was then stimulated with δ-like pulses to produce
this multi-sample error. The shift between both curves was included for better
visibility of the individual curves.
The short stops of the data ﬂow of the ADC are diﬃcult to analyze.
From their nature, they can be clearly categorized as single-event functional
interrupts. One of the previous campaigns on this ADC already found SEFIs
in the output of the delta-sigma modulator [54]. The cross section deduced
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from the previous experiment is 5-6 times smaller than the one found in this
work, but it is still highly probable that both failures are described by the
same event. The implementation of this speciﬁc delta-sigma modulator is
not public, so further investigation of this failure mode is not possible.
The change in the gain of the signal can be easily traced back to the cali-
bration block of the ADC. According to the conﬁguration of the ADC oﬀset,
gain and other values of the signal can be manipulated in this block. The
ADC has two conﬁguration modes. In register mode, all conﬁguration is
stored in registers in the ADC. Those values can be modiﬁed using the serial
interface of the ADC. In the second conﬁguration mode, pin-mode, all con-
ﬁguration is done by tying most of the ADC pins to a ﬁxed signal level. This
mode allows access to only a few of the conﬁguration options of the ADC.
The registers of all other options are set to standard values. During both
irradiation campaigns, the ADC was set to pin mode in order to increase the
radiation tolerance by ﬁxing the values of important conﬁgurations. While
in pin mode options like gain and oﬀset are not accessible by the user, but
SEUs can still change the values in the correlating registers which may lead
to gain changes as observed.
8.5.2 Failure mitigation
Digital ﬁltering
To limit the eﬀects of the found failure modes, dedicated mitigation measures
for each failure mode have to be included into the design. The observed failure
modes can be separated into two categories: failures that can be mitigated
by ﬁltering the ADC output signal and those that have an eﬀect too strong
to mitigate it by ﬁltering. Single-and multi-sample errors are of the former
type. Due to their origin being SEUs in the ADC, their occurrence cannot
be prevented. Therefore the only feasible method is to remove them from the
ADC output signal before it is used for quench detection. To this end a chain
of digital ﬁlters used to reject electrical noise was improved and extended to
also mitigate those two types of failures. Figure 8.15 shows the chain of
digital ﬁlters after it had been extended. The decimation of the signal was
included as a new ﬁrst step and the length of all other ﬁlters was chosen for
optimized ﬁltering of radiation failures.
Figure 8.15 shows starting from the left the ﬁlter chain that combines
error mitigation with noise suppression of the ADC signals and the calcula-
tions necessary for quench detection (see. eq. 4.1). The main ﬁlters used are
median and moving-average ﬁlters together with a decimation of the ADC
signal. The decimation of a signal takes several consecutive samples and
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Figure 8.15: Filter chain to mitigate single and multi-sample errors. The
input signals are the Voltage (UDiff ) and Current (IDcct) measured at the
magnet circuit coming from the left direction. Those measured signals are
then ﬁltered using several steps of decimation, median and moving-average
ﬁlters. Following this, the diﬀerence between measured and calculated voltage
is outputted as URes. With the parallel resistor (RPar) being the only resistive
part this value should be close to zero.
computes their average. Averaging over multiple samples has the advantage
of lowering the amplitude of oscillation type errors like multi-sample errors.
This works especially well if the error contains points both above and lower
than the undisturbed signal level. Furthermore, by combining 8 samples into
1 the length of disturbances like multi-sample errors is also divided by 8
which is essential for the median ﬁlter. The disadvantage of decimation is
that by reducing the sampling frequency of the signal the system response
time is slightly increased.
The median ﬁlter is similar to a shift register wherein each step the oldest
sample is replaced by a new one but within the median ﬁlter, the contents
of the register are sorted according to value. Each cycle the output of a
median ﬁlter is the sample in the middle of the shift register, the median,
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which blocks extreme values because they are never the median during the
time they are inside the register. The ability of a median ﬁlter to eliminate
spikes from a signal depends on the width of its register and the widths of the
spike. A ﬁlter with a width of n can only eliminate spikes with a length of
n−1
2
perfectly. Any longer spike can not be eliminated completely because the
n
2
sample of the spike will become the median. Single-sample errors can be
removed from the signal easily but multi-sample errors have a length around
54 samples. Even after decimation, they will be around 6 samples long which
would require a median ﬁlter with a length of 13 to ﬁlter. Due to a lack of
resources on the FPGA and due to the requirement of keeping the response
time as low as possible the median ﬁlter in the ﬁnal version was shorter than
that (length 11 for URes and 9 for IDcct). The ability of such a short ﬁlter
to eliminate multi-sample errors longer than half its width depends on the
presence of error samples on the other side of the baseline of the signal. In
a median ﬁlter, those samples would be sorted into the other half of the me-
dian ﬁlter and therefore not occupy the same space most of the error samples
would. Because a multi-sample error oscillates between high and low values
the existence of samples on both sides of the baseline is probable but also
heavily dependent on the position of the decimation windows. As can be
seen in ﬁgure 8.16 a shift of the decimation window by one sample can result
in one error spike that can be ﬁltered and one that can not be completely
eliminated.
The last component used during ﬁltering is a moving-average ﬁlter. The
main ability of a moving-average ﬁlter is to eliminate the noise of a signal
by averaging over a number of consecutive samples. This ability is crucial
because any noise would increase after derivation of the signal. Remaining
error signals that could not be fully eliminated by the median ﬁlter can only
be decreased in amplitude by the moving-average ﬁlter. This also reduces the
amplitude of the resulting error pulse in URes to keep it below the threshold
of ±100 mV.
Filter Resource and Delay Cost
During the design of the ﬁlter the resource cost and the delay each ﬁlter
component causes have to be accounted for. Because decimation decreases
the data rate by a factor of 8 the delay it causes is equal to 8 times the
original interval between samples tDelay,Decimation = 8 · 250 us = 2 ms.
The delay of a median ﬁlter is proportional to n−1
2
with n being the width
of the ﬁlter. A strong change in the signal only gets propagated after ﬁlling
one-half of the median ﬁlter with new samples. In case of the ﬁlter system
the delay of the UDiff median is 10 ms and for IDcct 12 ms. The delay of a
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Figure 8.16: The two spikes are the results of the decimation of the same
error found in the IDcct signal but with the decimation window shifted by one
sample. While very similar the crucial diﬀerence between the two spikes is that
the left one consists of 4 samples higher than the baseline while the right spike
consists of 5 samples of that kind. The rest of the samples of the error pulse
is of a value lower than the baseline. A median ﬁlter with a length 9, like it
is used for the IDcct signal, will be able to eliminate the left spike completely
while not being able to eliminate the ﬁrst point of the right spike. The result
will be a 5 sample plateau with the value of the least extreme of the 5 spike
samples.
moving-average ﬁlter is dependent on the width of the internal shift register,
the input signal and in the case of trigger applications the target threshold.
A moving-average ﬁlter propagates every change in its input signal without
any delay, but because the ﬁrst changed sample is averaged together with
the rest of the yet unchanged samples in the shift register, the output signal
rises slowly until the shift register is completely ﬁlled with new samples.
Therefore, depending on register length, the amplitude of the new samples
and threshold level it takes several sample cycles before a change higher than
the threshold gets propagated. Due to these many inﬂuencing factors, only a
worst-case delay can be calculated which is the length of the ﬁlter multiplied
by the decimated sample interval of 2 ms. For long moving average ﬁlters
like the one in the IDcct line (width 256) this can theoretically create a delay
in the range of half a second, but because magnet quenches produce large
changes in IDcct, the real delay is much shorter. While not a digital ﬁlter, the
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derivation of the signals in each data line also causes a delay which is the δt
of the derivation. Both lines use a δt of 16 ms.
As can be seen in ﬁgure 8.15, the delay length in the three branches of the
ﬁlter system is diﬀerent for every branch. This leads to a phase diﬀerence
when computing URes which will cause some distortions in the signal. But the
amplitude of these distortions is not high enough to cause spurious triggers.
Concerning resource costs of the ﬁlter components, the decimation and the
moving-average are very cost eﬃcient. Both ﬁlters require a shift register and
a division for averaging the contents of the register. By choosing a register
length which is a value of 2n, the division can be done by a simple bit-shift
operation. The necessary registers can be implemented using RAM memory
which is available in much higher amount than registers in the FPGA fabric.
The implementation of the median ﬁlter used is tuned for fast execution
and therefore requires an above average amount of hardware resources. In
the current implementation of the ﬁlter system, the median ﬁlters utilize
18.8% of the logic elements of the FPGA. Previous versions of the ﬁlter
system decimated the signals only by a factor of four which, in turn, required
longer median ﬁlters with a length of 18-20. Median ﬁlter of this dimension
already utilized about 28% of the FPGA. Therefore, we decided to double
the decimation factor.
Filter Simulation
To verify the ability of the described ﬁlter system to mitigate all distortions in
the signal a LabView test bench was created. This test bench mimicked all
elements present in the ﬁlter chain. As input for the two data channels UDiff
and IDcct simulated magnet signals measured during the second irradiation
campaign were used. This data sample was taken while irradiating the test
board with a dose of 790 Gy.
Focus during the simulation was also the inﬂuence of a shift of the decimation
window on the ability to mitigate one speciﬁc signal distortion. Therefore all
data samples were used eight times while shifting the decimation window by
one each time. The results of this simulation showed that the ﬁlter system is
suﬃciently able to mitigate signal distortions. The simulation showed that
due to the much lower dynamic range of the UDiff no observed distortions
in this line could cause spikes in the URes signal surpassing the threshold.
Distortions in IDcct can cause such spikes depending on the position of the
decimation window.
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ADC stop mitigation
If the signal of one ADC stops this will, in most cases, lead to fulﬁlling
the trigger condition of the QDS. Unless the magnet current is constant
for a time, a stop would lead quickly to a misalignment of the two signals.
Fortunately, the data about ADC stops has shown that most of them last only
about 62 samples. The latest versions of the system use a sampling frequency
of 4 kHz after switching the ADC conﬁguration method from pin mode to
register mode (see. chap. 8.5.2). Therefore a 62 sample stop only lasts 15
ms. With the required reaction time of the QDS being 100 ms, an ADC stop
of this length is not inherently critical. But with one ADC stopped the still
changing data from the other ADC would quickly create a trigger condition
for the QDS.Therefore, all triggers from the QDS have to be prevented during
the duration of the stop. To achieve this, the result of the derivation of
the stopped signal is held constant until the stop recovers. Furthermore,
once a stop recovers, the new samples could have a large diﬀerence to the
ones remaining from before the stop. This diﬀerence would cause a huge
spike in the derivated signal causing a QDS trigger. To mitigate this eﬀect
the derivation is held constant not only until the stop recovers but until
all samples from before the stop have been cleared from the system. The
derivation uses a derivation interval ∂t of 16 ms which, even together with
the stop length, is well below the reaction time.
In order to mitigate the few stops longer than the standard length, a system
was included in the ADC VHDL interface to restart the ADC in the case of
a stop. For this purpose, the ﬂow of samples from the ADC is monitored
to detect missing ones. In the case of a missing sample, either the reset or
power cycle pin of the ADC is toggled to initiate a restart. The restart time
after toggling one of these pins is the same as the standard stop length, so
no additional time is lost in this procedure. If the ADC does not resume
function after this time, the restart is attempted a second time. If both tries
fail, the interface sends a critical failure notice to the QDS leading to a beam
abort.
Mitigation of conﬁguration corruption
While corruption of the conﬁguration of the ADC was the rarest of the dis-
covered error modes, it has the highest probability of causing a QDS trigger.
Even small changes in gain or oﬀset could trigger the QDS at some point. To
mitigate this failure mode it is necessary to detect any corruption in the con-
ﬁguration and overwrite it with the proper settings. This required a switch
from the pin mode of the ADC to the register mode due to the register not
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being accessible in pin mode. The switch to register mode allows access to
the registers using a serial interface and also allows to run the ADC at its
highest sampling rate of 4 kHz which is not usable in pin mode. This increase
in sampling frequency was helpful for the digital ﬁltering of multi-sample er-
rors because the decimation factor could be increased without losing any
more reaction speed. The read-out of the whole conﬁguration of the ADC is
a fast process and can be done between the readout of each 4 kHz sample.
In the case of a corruption, the register is completely rewritten. For this
process, the ADC has to be interrupted, but the total time for rewriting and
restarting the ADC is lower than the necessary reaction time of the QDS.
8.5.3 Mitigation results
To varying degrees, all mitigation measures were tested upon their eﬃciency.
A ﬁrst prototype of the digital ﬁlter chain was already in use during the
second irradiation campaign. The results of this chain were already very
good mitigating all single and most of the multi-sample errors. ADC stops
were also partially mitigated during the second campaign by including the
masking feature to prevent any triggering during a normal-length ADC stop.
Table 8.3 shows the results of the mitigation measures used during that
campaign. As can be seen, most failures could be mitigated leading to a
combined error cross sections well below the one required.
Error Qty. Qty. after Annual Fluence Cross section
Type mitigation in cm−2 in cm2/Device
Single-sample 191 0 1.85± 0.09 · 1012 0
Multi-sample 97 2 1.85± 0.09 · 1012 1.08± 0.54 · 10−12
ADC stops 35 2 6.24± 0.31 · 1012 3.21± 0.16 · 10−13
Conﬁguration 2 2 6.24± 0.31 · 1012 3.205± 0.16 · 10−13
Combined 1.72± 0.57 · 10−12
Table 8.3: Results of the mitigation measures during the second irradiation
campaign. Two multi-sample and two long ADC stops could not be mitigated.
Mitigation against conﬁguration corruption was not yet in place.
Further simulation of the ﬁlter chain revealed the relation between the
possibility to mitigate a multi-sample error and the position of the decimation
window. Simulations with the data from the second campaign and the newest
version of the ﬁlter chain lowered the cross section of multi-sample errors for a
QDS circuit board (not a single ADC) down to 1.54±0.25·10−12 cm2/Circuit
Board. This includes the ﬁndings that due to the lower dynamic range of the
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signal no observed multi-sample error can pass the mitigation measures if it
occurred in UDiff .
A third irradiation campaign in the mixed ﬁeld facility CHARM was con-
ducted to verify the remaining mitigation measures. Unfortunately, this cam-
paign suﬀered from severe mistakes during preparation and produced few
results. Due to missing conﬁguration on the DUT the mitigation measures
for multi- and single-sample errors were not active. Therefore no additional
data about the eﬀectiveness of these mitigation measures could be collected.
What could be observed was that the technique to restart the ADC using
either the reset or power cycle pin as soon as a stop is detected proved inef-
fective. Most likely only an external power cycle has the ability to interrupt
an ADC stop. Unfortunately, this is not possible with the current hardware
setup.
Corruption of the ADC conﬁguration could not be observed during the third
campaign. The general ability of the interface to change ADC conﬁguration
was veriﬁed outside of radiation. Furthermore, a detailed simulation using a
self-written hardware model of the ADC was used to verify the proper timing
of the mitigation measure during ADC operation.
Combining all the results from the latest version of all mitigation measures
produces a cross-section of 2.179± 0.282 · 10−12cm2 for one QDS board and
4.358 ± 0.564 · 10−10cm2 for the whole QDS system comprising 200 boards.
This is an order of magnitude lower than the requirements for the system.
These results are derived from data acquired during irradiation campaigns
using a mono-energetic proton beam which usually causes less severe radia-
tion errors than a mixed ﬁeld with a energies well into the GeV range. But
even after applying the safety margin for such a beam (a factor of two) the
requirements of the system are still fulﬁlled by a wide margin.
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Chapter 9
Irradiation campaigns in support
of further radiation-tolerant
designs
As discussed earlier to retain the ability to create radiation-tolerant systems
it is required to have access to a database listing the behavior of components
under radiation. The following sections list the results of the irradiation
campaigns of several components that either have been used in projects (in-
cluding the 600 A QDS) or are planned to be used in future projects. The
following devices were all irradiated at PSI using a 200 MeV proton beam.
Most campaigns used a new data-acquisition system and a new test-board
which are described in 9.1.2.
9.1 The MAX1162 and MAX11100 ADCs
9.1.1 Description of the Component
The MAX1162 [56] is 16 bit ADC based on the successive approximation
method (SAR) with a maximum sampling frequency of 200 kSPS. Since 2009
it is part of the symmetric quench detector, but it was never tested for its
radiation tolerance in detail. The MAX11100 [57] is an ADC with very
similar speciﬁcations to the MAX1162, albeit with diﬀerent pin-out and a
lower price. It will be used for the new main quadrupole QDS which will be
installed during long shutdown 2 (2018-2019). The successive approximation
method that both ADCs use and its generally simpler structure (see ﬁg. 9.1)
was also hoped to be resistant to single event eﬀects (SEE).
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Device Name Device Type Irradiated Dose [Gy]
MAX1162 ADC 500
MAX11100 ADC 500
MAX6250 Voltage Reference 500
ADR421 Voltage Reference 380
ADR435 Voltage Reference 500
AT25DF041A Flash Memory 520
ADUM3402 Digital isolator 580
INA128 Instrumentation Ampliﬁer 360-500
AQW210EHA PhotoMOS 160
AQV251A PhotoMOS 300
Table 9.1: Overview of irradiated DUTs
Figure 9.1: Building blocks of the MAX1162/11100. The track-and-hold
block samples the input signal and holds its output signal constant for a speciﬁc
minimum time. The SAR ADC block contains the successive approximation
algorithm. The control block enables or disables the ADC and the serial data
link transmits the digital output value to the outside.
9.1.2 Irradiation Campaign on the ADCsMAX1162/11100
The irradiation campaign of the MAX1162 and the MAX11100 was con-
ducted at PSI. The test utilized the new universal radiation tester baseboard
(see ﬁg. 9.2). The board contains a ProAsic3E FPGA [58] for control
and data acquisition and two RS485 ports [59]. One is dedicated to the
acquisition of data while the other can be used for communication between
user control and FPGA. RS485 has the advantage of being much more stable
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in irradiation environments. The DUT only requires a very simple adapter
component, which was presumed to be very radiation-tolerant, to receive and
send RS485 communication. Furthermore, the usage of a diﬀerential signal
for communication allows a high noise resistance and enables communication
over a distance of 30 m. In comparison to the previous method of using
SPI/I2C this eliminates the need for a converter module to Ethernet close to
the beam which was a possible cause for problems during previous irradia-
tion campaigns. Furthermore, the maximum data throughput of 2.5 MBaud
allows to acquire a large amount of data from the DUT. All used components
of the test-board are radiation tolerant components.
Figure 9.3 shows two schematics (top MAX1162, bottom Max11100) of
the adapter boards holding the respective DUTs. The adapter boards are
connected to the backside of the baseboard. Due to the maximum diameter
of the PSI beam of a few centimeters, the electronic components on the
baseboard receives a small dose during an irradiation campaign only. The
radiation tolerance for most of the components, like the operation ampliﬁer
used, are known, or they are even immune to radiation.
As with the ADS1281, the test was conducted by stimulating the ADCs
with a sinusoid wave and reading out all sampled data for later analysis.
Several ADCs of both types were tested together. Additionally, the power
consumption of the ADCs was monitored for latch-ups and dose-related drift.
As shown in ﬁgure 9.4, the current consumption remains constant for a dose
of up to 200 Gy, which again is fully suﬃcient for operation in most of
the irradiated areas in the LHC. The spike around 100 Gy could not be
categorized because the ADC data showed no reaction at that point in time.
As with the ADS1281, the drift of the maximum and minimum of the
measured sine wave was analysed for both the MAX1162 and MAX11100.
Figures 9.5 to 9.8 show the results of maximum and minimum drift for both
ADCs and a close-up view on the area between 0 and 220 Gy. These ﬁgures
were created by separating the ADC data in blocks equaling one second of
data and determining the maximum and minimum values of these blocks.
Both ADCs behave very similarly regarding their signal drift. In the area
between 0 to 160 Gy for the maximum and 0 to 120 Gy for the minimum, the
signal level remains constant. Until a dose of 220 Gy, the signal drops by an
average of 0.2% and further to 1.5% until the end of the measurement. The
drift is signiﬁcantly larger than the oﬀset and gain error speciﬁed in the data
sheet at a maximum of 1 mV. Nonetheless, the drift in the ﬁrst 100 Gy is
suﬃciently low and a dose budget of over 100 Gy remains suﬃcient for QDS
projects where dose-rates even during HL-LHC will be well bellow 10 Gy a
year in most areas.
Analysis of the ADC data found only one failure mode in the form of
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Figure 9.2: The baseboard used during the irradiation campaign is equipped
with a ProAsic3E FPGA [51] [58] which is known for its radiation-tolerance
(25*27 cm). An adapter board carrying the DUTs is attached to a connector
on the back side of the board (location of the hole). The beam is collimated
to a maximum diameter of 5 cm focused on the position of the DUTs. With
the collimator, the radiation level in other parts of the base board remain low.
Furthermore, the components were selected for their radiation tolerance. The
two connectors at the bottom left allow for transmission of measurement data
and control of the FPGA to and from a PC using an RS485/UART interface.
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Figure 9.3: Schematics of the adapter boards containing the DUTs
((A) MAX1162, (B) MAX11100). These boards are connected to the
baseboard 9.2 during irradiation.
single-sample spikes in the output signal. The cause of such a spike are either
SEUs in the SAR (Successive Approximation Register) or a register inside
the serial block (see ﬁg. 9.1). Figure 9.9 shows the total number of errors in
relation to the dose. These ﬁgures were created by counting all errors found
in the data and plotting their sum in relation to the total dose. Errors within
an interval of 5 mGy were summed up and for better visibility in the plot,
the total number of single-sample errors was capped at 193,520. All devices
under test (DUT) showed similar behavior by having a low error rate up to
a total integrated dose of 220 Gy. At some point beyond that, the error rate
increases exponentially until most measured samples are faulty. All DUTs
experienced this increase in error rate at a total integrated dose of 500 Gy,
although none of them had a complete functional breakdown. Because the
only error mode is single-sample spikes, they can be easily ﬁltered by using a
median ﬁlter. This would allow for the usage of the ADCs without additional
redundancy measures in areas with annual radiation doses of 1-10 Gy.
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Figure 9.4: Current consumption of the circuit containing ADCs. This
change occurred while irradiating the MAX11100 up to a dose of 360 Gy.
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Figure 9.5: Drift of the maxi-
mum of the MAX1162 ADC data
(top) and a close up view of the
range until 220 Gy. This drift is
caused by to the inﬂuence of cu-
mulative damage to the ADC sil-
icon fabric.
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Figure 9.6: Drift of the mini-
mum of the MAX1162 ADC data
(top) and a close up view of the
range until 220 Gy. This drift is
caused by to the inﬂuence of cu-
mulative damage to the ADC sil-
icon fabric.
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Figure 9.7: Drift of the max-
imum of the MAX11100 ADC
data (top) and a close up view of
the range until 220 Gy. This drift
is caused by to the inﬂuence of
cumulative damage to the ADC
silicon fabric. The distortion at
130 Gy was caused by the test-
board.
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Figure 9.8: Drift of the min-
imum of the MAX11100 ADC
data (top) and a close up view of
the range until 220 Gy. This drift
is caused by to the inﬂuence of
cumulative damage to the ADC
silicon fabric.
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Figure 9.9: Integrated error distribution in relation to the total dose for
MAX1162 (left) and MAX11100 (right). These ﬁgures were created by count-
ing all errors found in the data and plotting their sum in relation to the total
dose. Errors inside an interval of 5 mGy were counted together and the total
amount of errors was capped at 193,520.
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9.1.3 Conclusion
The results of the previous chapter show that both ADCs display suﬃ-
cient radiation-tolerance to be used for their respective projects (symmetric
quench detector and main quadrupole QDS). The current consumption of
the MAX1162 and the MAX11100 remained constant until about 200 Gy,
and the current consumption of the entire board used during the test of the
ADS1281 showed no signiﬁcant increase or drop. No latch-ups were detected
for all DUTs. Both ADCs experienced a drift of their output signal with in-
creasing dose. Starting at 100 Gy the growth rate of the deviation increases
signiﬁcantly. A maximum deviation of 1.5% is reached until the end of the
measurement at 420 Gy. During the ﬁrst 100 Gy the deviation of the sig-
nal is very low so the component can be used for QDS projects. Besides
dose tolerance, the QDS system requires a very low error rate for the full
system. The QDS system aims for maximal two beam aborts a year due
to radiation-induced errors. Critical errors are those that force an abort of
the beam, blind the system or require intervention in the accelerator. None
of the ADCs experienced a complete functional breakdown requiring an in-
tervention to replace it. The MAX1162 and the MAX11100 showed a very
low vulnerability to SEEs. The only error mode observed was single-sample
spikes, which can be easily mitigated.Therefore, it can operate as part of the
QDS without signiﬁcantly increasing the total error rate of the system. The
ADCs showed a high tolerance to TID up to a limit of 300 Gy. These are
very good values because the expected total dose for the QDS system is much
lower.
With all this considered, it can be concluded that both ADCs are suﬃciently
radiation-tolerant to be used as part of the QDS.
9.2 Voltage References MAX6250, ADR421 and
ADR435
9.2.1 Description of the Components
Voltage references are required for high-precision voltage measurements. But
usually, the precision of references degrades due to the inﬂuence of cumula-
tive radiation damage. In order to ﬁnd a voltage reference with the least
loss in precision, an irradiation campaign targeting three voltage references
(MAX6250 with ±1 mV precision [60], ADR421 ±3 mV precision [61] and
ADR435 ±3 mV precision [62]) was conducted.
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9.2.2 Irradiation Campaign on the Voltage References
MAX6250, ADR421 and ADR435
The irradiation took place at PSI and used the new universal radiation tester
baseboard (see ﬁg. 9.2). Each adapter board contained 8 DUTs of one type.
During irradiation the output voltage of each DUT was measured separately
as well as the current consumption for the whole board. Figures 9.10 to 9.15
show the results of these measurements and compare the measured output
voltage with the speciﬁcations given in the data sheet.
Figure 9.10: Measured output voltages of the eight MAX6250 DUTs in re-
lation to the increasing TID. The red dashed line shows the maximal allowed
deviation from the reference voltage to be expected due to production [60]. As
can be seen the cumulative damage due to TID causes the output voltage to
drop linearly until about 320 Gy.
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Figure 9.11: The current consumption of the MAX6250 was not measured for
each device individually but for all eight voltage references together. Similar to
the output voltage the current consumption drops linearly during irradiation
until about 400 Gy and remains constant until end of measurement.
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Figure 9.12: Measured output voltage of the ADR421 in relation to the
increasing TID. Due to beam stops during the measurement the TID is plotted
as separate graph over the measurement time. The red dotted line shows the
tolerance to be expected due to production [61]. As can be seen the cumulative
damage due to TID causes the output voltage to increase.
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Figure 9.13: The current consumption of the ADR421 was not measured for
each device individually, but for all eight voltage references combined. Follow-
ing the output voltage, the current consumption increases with the TID.
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Figure 9.14: Measured output voltage of the ADR435 in relation to the
increasing TID. Due to beam stops (in this ﬁgure the beam started only after
about 100 sec of the measurement)during the measurement the TID is plotted
as separate graph over the measurement time. The red dotted line shows the
acceptable voltage error caused during production listed in the datasheet [62].
This voltage reference is sold in two accuracy categories with diﬀerent output
spread which are both plotted as dotted red lines. For this voltage reference
two drift processes caused by TID oppose each other which allows the reference
to remain within the speciﬁcations (A spec ±6 mV and B spec ±2 mV)for more
than 200 Gy.
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Figure 9.15: The current consumption of the ADR435 was not measured
for each device individually, but for all eight voltage references together. The
behavior of the current consumption mimics the overall behavior of the output
voltage, staying fairly constant while the upward and downward drift negate
each other and rising when the upward drift increases.
9.2.3 Conclusion
All tested voltage references show a clear drift of their output voltage as
a function of the TID. But due to their design, the drift varies both in
strength and sign. From the three voltage references, the ADR435 breaks its
speciﬁcations only at 200 Gy which is the best value for all tested voltage
references.
9.3 The AT25DF041A Flash Memory
9.3.1 Description of the Component
Many QDS systems require a non-volatile storage medium. The 600 A QDS
system as an example uses three ﬂash memory chips for the storage of thresh-
old data. Inherently, ﬂash memory cells are immune to bit ﬂips by SEUs,
but errors can still happen during the read process or the ﬂash can stop to
function due to cumulative damage. The AT25DF041A 6 Mbit ﬂash [63] was
expected to be compatible with many systems already in place because ﬂash
devices from the same manufacturer were already in use.
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9.3.2 Irradiation Campaign on the AT25DF041A Flash
Memory
The irradiation took place at PSI. To verify its radiation-tolerance, the ﬂash
memory was, in several steps, irradiated up to a TID of 560 Gy. Before
irradiation and in between irradiation steps every byte of the ﬂash memory
was programmed with the LSB of its address which was read out at maximum
speed during irradiation phases. The readout data was then compared to the
pattern to search for read errors. The results are shown in ﬁgure 9.16
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Figure 9.16: All six ﬂash memories showed only very low error rates. During
irradiation up to a TID of 520 Gy a total of 1.2·109 read cycles were conducted.
A maximum of 20 reads contained at least one wrong value.
Up to a TID of 520 Gy a total of 1.2 · 109 read operations on each device
were conducted, and the total error rate remained low. Shortly after passing
the TID of 520 Gy, one device became completely inoperable. In the following
irradiation step all remaining ﬂashes produced large amounts of read-out
errors. Consecutive read-outs showed a ﬁxed relation between failed and
successful read-outs. Such a scenario could be explained by sectors of the
ﬂash memory losing their ability to be read-out. Any readout of the whole
ﬂash memory would therefore result in errors for those sectors ad successful
reads for the rest, hence a ﬁxed relation between errors and successes.
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9.3.3 Conclusion
A dose budget of 520 Gy is fully suﬃcient for QDS projects, and the low
amount of read errors can be mitigated by using three memory chips and
voting over the read result. This is already done successfully for the 600
A QDS project. Another mitigation option, if time constraints allow for it,
would be reading the data three times from one ﬂash and voting for the
correct result. Data corruption by SEUs is usually not possible with ﬂash
cells. Therefore, a temporal triplication can mitigate all errors during the
read process. Unfortunately the component is no longer produced but a
suﬃcient supply was acquired to ﬁnish all current projects utilizing it. A
successor model exists (the AT25SF041 ﬂash memory) but was produced
using a diﬀerent process. Therefore no predictions can be made how this
model would behave under radiation.
9.4 The ADUM3402 Digital insulator
9.4.1 Description of the Component
The ADUM3402 is a 4-channel low power digital insulator [64]. Digital in-
sulators are basic electronic components used to transmit signals between
otherwise isolated circuits. It was tested to search for upsets in the output
signal and to test the general dose tolerance.
9.4.2 Irradiation Campaign on the ADUM3402 Digital
insulator
The campaign was conducted at PSI. During irradiation the insulator was
stimulated with a 8 Hz square signal, while the output signal was sampled
with 40 MHz and the result was compared with the expectation value. No
upsets were found during irradiation to a TID of 580 Gy, and all DUTs
remained functional to the end of the irradiation procedure. No detailed
measurements on the current consumption were conducted, but the initial
consumption of 50 mA for the whole test board increased to 140 mA after
irradiation.
9.4.3 Conclusion
No upsets were found during the irradiation, and the total dose tolerance was
shown to be very high. Therefore the component can be used in environments
featuring ionizing radiation without additional mitigation measures.
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9.5 The INA128 Instrumentation Ampliﬁer
9.5.1 Description of the Component
The INA128 is a low-power general-purpose high-precision instrumentation
ampliﬁer. There are currently no projects in planning that will use it, but
as a general-purpose component, it can be of use in many future projects.
9.5.2 Irradiation Campaign on the INA128 Instrumen-
tation Ampliﬁer
The irradiation campaign on the INA128 [65] instrumentation ampliﬁer fo-
cused on determining the inﬂuence of TID on the output voltage and the
input bias current (a automatic current in one direction present in bi-polar
devices). The irradiation took place at PSI and used the new universal radi-
ation tester baseboard (see ﬁg. 9.2). Two boards each equipped with eight
instrumentation ampliﬁers were irradiated with doses up to 500 Gy, and four
of the ampliﬁers on each board were used to measure bias current or output
voltage. Furthermore, the current consumption of each board was measured
during irradiation. The results of the measurements are presented in ﬁgures
9.17 to 9.19.
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Figure 9.17: Measurement of the output voltage of the INA128. Of the 16
total instrumentation ampliﬁers distributed over two test boards four on each
board were used to measure the output voltage and four to measure the bias
current. As can be seen in both ﬁgures (top board 1 and bottom board 2) there
is a general upwards drift of output during irradiation. The devices exceed the
speciﬁed limits (±1.2 mV with a gain of 1, see [65]) at doses above 50 Gy. In
this ﬁgure the total ionizing dose (TID) is given by the blue line and the right
y-axis. All other curves depict the output voltage of the DUT measured in
Volt (left y-axis).
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Figure 9.18: Measurement of the bias current of the INA128. Of the 16 total
instrumentation ampliﬁers distributed over two test boards four on each board
were used to measure the output voltage and four to measure the bias current
(top board 1 and bottom board 2). While there is a slight increase of the
current even until 490 Gy the speciﬁcations (±5 nA [65]) are met. The TID is
given by the blue line and the right y-axis while all others curves and the left
y-axis describe the bias voltage.
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Figure 9.19: The current consumption of all eight instrumentation ampliﬁers
on both boards was measured together (top board 1 and bottom board 2). A
clear downward drift in relation to the TID can be seen. The TID is given
by the blue line and the right y-axis while all others curves and the left y-axis
describe the current consumption.
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9.5.3 Conclusion
After a TID of 50 Gy, the DUT exceeded the limits deﬁned in the speciﬁca-
tions. This is a low dose tolerance in comparison with other tested devices.
Nonetheless, in shielded areas, as described in section 6, this level of radiation
tolerance is still suﬃcient. In areas with higher radiation level, a diﬀerent
choice of the device would be advisable.
9.6 The AQW210EHA PhotoMOS
9.6.1 Description of the Component
The PhotoMOS tested was the AQW210EHA [66], which was already used
in QDS projects. The test focused on ﬁnding transients and to determine
the total dose tolerance.
9.6.2 Irradiation Campaign on the AQW210EHA Pho-
toMOS
The irradiation campaign was conducted at PSI. During irradiation the Pho-
toMOS was stimulated with a slow square signal while reading its state with
40 MHz frequency and comparing the result with the expected state. A total
of twelve PhotoMOS were tested in parallel and were irradiated up to a dose
of 160 Gy. No transients were found, but the PhotoMOS started to expe-
rience functional breakdown starting at a dose of 120 Gy. At 160 Gy only
three PhotoMOS remained intact.
9.6.3 Conclusion
The immunity to upset due to radiation up to 120 Gy allows for the compo-
nent to remain part of current QDS projects. While the total dose tolerance
is not very high, it is suﬃcient for most shielded areas in the vicinity of the
LHC.
9.7 The AQV251A PhotoMOS
9.7.1 Description of the Component
Due to the high on-state resistance and the low dose tolerance of the AQW210EHA
a second PhotoMOS, the AQV251A [67], was tested. Some planned systems
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use long lines of several PhotoMOS. Such a line would have a too high resis-
tance with a on-state resistance like the previous PhotoMOS. Besides ﬁnding
possible transients, as with the AQW210EHA, this test also focused on the
eﬀects of TID on the on-state resistance and in which state the PhotoMOS
would remain after a functional breakdown. The failure mode is an important
information concerning the QDS safety.
9.7.2 Irradiation Campaign on the AQV251A Photo-
MOS
The irradiation took place at PSI and used the new universal radiation tester
baseboard (see ﬁg. 9.2). For this test eight PhotoMOS were irradiated and
their output voltage was measured (see ﬁg. 9.20).
During irradiation the PhotoMOS were stimulated with a 8 Hz square-
wave signal. Therefore, the output voltage would switch between high and
low values as the PhotoMOS opens and closes. To calculate the on-state
resistance only voltage values from the closed state are required. For this
purpose the voltage data was ﬁltered by replacing any points from the oﬀ
stage with points from the previous on-state and eliminating any remaining
points from ﬂanks with a short median ﬁlter. The resulting data is shown in
ﬁgure 9.21. Figure 9.22 shows the behavior of the on-state resistance during
irradiation calculated from the ﬁltered voltage data.
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Figure 9.20: Schematic of the test setup used during the irradiation campaign
on the AQV251. The PhotoMOS is connected in pattern A according to the
data-sheet [68]. The voltage drop over the PhotoMOS is ampliﬁed by a factor
of 100 before measurement.
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Figure 9.21: Eight AQV251 PhotoMOS were tested in parallel and their
output was measured to observe the inﬂuence of TID. The data for this plot
was created by ﬁltering the eight oscillating voltage signals and removing all
samples no belonging to the on-state of the PhotoMOS. All PhotoMOS expe-
rience slow downward drift up to a critical dose above 170 Gy they experience
functional breakdown in an permanently open condition. This state would
activate the beam interlocks and is therefore a safe state.
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Figure 9.22: The on-state resistance of the eight photoMOS was calculated
from the ﬁltered data in ﬁgure 9.21. The calculated on-state resistance is in
good agreement with the values given in [68].
107
As can be seen from ﬁgure 9.21 and 9.22 the inﬂuence of TID on the
output voltage and on-state resistance is low until a critical dose of about
175 Gy is reached. The AQV251 therefore shows a higher dose tolerance than
the AQW210EHA which could only tolerate 120 Gy. By counting ﬂanks in
the unﬁltered voltage data is was also proven that until critical dose the
PhotoMOS never failed to switch state following the stimulus signal. When
failing the AQV251 remains in an open state which is the preferred state for
the QDS system.
9.7.3 Conclusion
The results of the AQV251 are better than those of the AQW210EHA with
a higher dose tolerance and no upsets. The on-state resistance is also lower
and stays constant until 175 Gy. This qualiﬁes it for usage in a long interlock
loop. The breakdown of the device leaves it in an open state which makes it
a secure component for a beam interlock.
9.8 Conclusion and outlook
The chapters 8 and 9 describe all irradiation campaigns conducted by the
team responsible for the 600 A QDS at CERN. These campaigns were nec-
essary to acquire information about the radiation tolerance of components
planned to be part of future projects or already part of some systems already
at work in the machine. The information gained allowed for the successful
design of the new 600 A QDS system and several other components with
good radiation tolerance were found. These new components will be a valu-
able asset in the further development of radiation tolerant systems at CERN.
Furthermore, after every irradiation campaign the tools and methods for data
acquisition, planning and execution of campaigns, error handling and after
campaign data analysis have been improved considerably. The experience
gained during these 3 years will be an asset in further eﬀorts to understand
the behavior of yet untested components under radiation.
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Chapter 10
Irradiation campaigns on the
SmartFusion2/Igloo2 FPGA
The new 600 A QDS system uses the ProAsic3 [69], an FPGA based on
130 nm ﬂash technology as one of its main components. This FPGA has
a long history of being used in radiation-tolerant projects and its behav-
ior under radiation is well known [70](e.g. symmetric quench detector for
main dipoles and quadrupoles DQQDS and a quench heater supervision unit
DQHSU). Unfortunately, projects like the 600 A QDS already use more than
90% of the logic cells of the ProAsic3, which can cause problems during im-
plementation. For future projects that could have an even bigger scope it is
therefore required to ﬁnd a new radiation-tolerant FPGA with higher capac-
ity. Microsemi, also producing the ProAsic3, has recently released the next
generation FPGA SmartFusion2 based on 65 nm ﬂash technology. Using
this FPGA allows to realize more complex and larger functions. The Smart-
Fusion2 is an FPGA that combines the logic elements of an FPGA with an
integrated hardcore Advanced RISC Machines (ARM) processor. This com-
bination would allow to combine the parallel processing of an FPGA with
the ability to run C-code on the processor. Unfortunately, a processor is very
vulnerable to SEUs and therefore not usable for radiation-tolerant projects.
Microsemi also oﬀers the Igloo2, an FPGA based on the same layout as the
SmartFusion2but without the ARM processor. Due to the lower prices the
Igloo2 would be the preferred component for radiation-tolerant projects.
Irradiation campaigns were conducted using the SmartFusion2, but due to
the similarity of their design all results should be valid for the Igloo2 as
well.
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10.1 Irradiation campaign on the SmartFusion2
To verify its radiation tolerance, an irradiation campaign targeting the Smart-
Fusion2 was conducted at PSI in collaboration with another team from
CERN. The SmartFusion2 is a possible future component for radiation tol-
erant equipment. Besides the normal FPGA fabric the SmartFusion2 also
contains a microcontroller subsystem which can be accessed from the fabric
using an Advanced-High-performance-bus-lite (AHBL) (see ﬁg.10.1). This
subsystem contains additional memory elements like an SRAM and a Flash
storage. As part of this irradiation campaign these two storages were tested
for their vulnerability to radiation, focusing mostly on the eﬀects of SEEs.
Figure 10.1: Schematic of the SmartFusion2 focusing on the division be-
tween FPGA fabric and micro-controller subsystem (HPMS). All user cre-
ated algorithms are located in the FPGA fabric. Direct read and write access
to elements of the HPMS from the FPGA fabric are not possible. All com-
mands to elements like the ﬂash memory (eNVM) and the eSRAM have to be
passed through the Advanced-High-performance-bus-lite (AHBL). Therefore,
an AHBL master has to be created in the FPGA fabric to connect to this bus.
The test board used during this campaign was the SmartFusion2 development-
kit produced by Microsemi (see ﬁg. 10.2). This board was used to save
the development time for a dedicated test board. The development kits orig-
inally ship with an outdated version of the FPGA. This version was already
known to suﬀer from micro-latch-ups. Microsemi claimed to have ﬁxed
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these latch-ups in the newest version of the FPGA. Therefore, the FPGA on
the development kit was replaced with a current version SmartFusion2.
Figure 10.2: Development board of the SmartFusion2 by Microsemi (about
20 cm x 10 cm) [71]
Before irradiation both SRAM and Flash were written with a known pat-
tern which was then read out during irradiation. The read-out data was com-
pared with the pattern using a triplicated algorithm running in the FPGA
fabric. The triplication protects the read-out algorithm in order to prevent
errors in the data transmission to appear as errors in the target system. The
results of the comparison were then sent to the user using a RS485/UART
data line. For the SRAM the data transmitted to the user contained both
the error counter as well as the full data read-out from the eSRAM. In case of
the ﬂash memory only the error counters were transmitted to the user. The
radiation targeted the whole FPGA but during each test only one component
of the FPGA was tested at once. Its not possible to eliminate the possibility
that some errors during one measurement steam from components that were
not the target of that measurement, but if any this interference should be
small.
10.2 Results
Table 10.1 shows the results of the irradiation of the eSRAM of the Smart-
Fusion2. During irradiation, the data was read out from a partition of
111
Run Nr. Dose Fluence Events Cross section Cross section
in Gy in cm−2 in cm2/Device in cm2/Bit
1 82 1.409·1011 467 3.314±0.165 · 10−9 2.529±0.126 · 10−14
2 29 4.983·1010 131 2.629±0.131 · 10−9 2.006±0.1 · 10−14
3 59 1.014·1011 315 3.107±0.155 · 10−9 2.371±0.118 · 10−14
4 64 1.1·1011 290 2.636±0.132 · 10−9 2.012±0.1 · 10−14
Comb. 234 4.021 ·1011 1203 2.992 ±0.15 · 10−9 2.283 ±0.114 · 10−14
Table 10.1: Results of the ESRAM irradiation campaign
the eSRAM with a size of 131040 bit. The per bit cross section of this
SRAM of about 2.28±0.15 · 10−14cm2/Bit is a good result comparable to
other radiation-tolerant SRAMs (eg. Cypress CY62157EV30 memory with
a cross-section of 2·10−13cm2/Bit).
The results from the eNVM ﬂash were very unsatisfying. Already during
the ﬁrst irradiation at a dose of only 60-70 Gy a constant large number of
mismatches (1023 of 65024) appeared during the read out of the ﬂash. Until
a dose of 120 Gy this number returned to zero for a short time and then
climbed to the maximum number (65024) of bits read from the ﬂash. The
following runs including several rewrites of the ﬂash content produced similar
or worse results.
10.3 Results from other research teams
In parallel to this test of the SmartFusion2 another research team was mea-
suring the SEE cross sections of the main FPGA fabric [72]. This tests
included tests on the ﬂip-ﬂops of the logic cells, the fabric SRAM, the arith-
metic blocks/multipliers, counters, reprogrammability and the CoreABC bus
controller responsible for the Advanced microcontroller Bus Architecture
(AMBA) and Advanced Peripheral Bus (APB). Furthermore the current con-
sumption was measured during all tests to search for SEL.
The cross sections found during the test of the fabric ﬂip-ﬂops range between
2.59·10−14cm2 and 6.49·10−15cm2. A surprising result is that TMR protected
ﬂip-ﬂops did not show a signiﬁcant decrease in cross section with values be-
tween 3.79·10−15cm2 and 3.51·10−15cm2. This issue is currently under further
investigation. The whole test suﬀered from a low total amount of detected
events, but shows a clear trend in the behavior of the ﬂip-ﬂops. Furthermore
a steep increase in the error rate up to twice the value until then was de-
tected after a total dose of 200 Gy. The device started failing a a dose above
580 Gy.
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Test Target Cross Section
in cm2/Bit
ESRAM 2.283± 0.15 · 10−14
Flip-Flops 6.49 · 10−152.59 · 10−14
Flip-Flops TMR 3.79 · 10−153.51 · 10−15
Fabric SRAM 2.36 · 10−14
Multiplier 1.5 · 10−11
Multiplier Accumulator 6.5 · 10−12
Combination of 32 single byte counters 2.46 · 10−14
521 bit counter 1.7 · 10−14
512 bit counter TMR 4.73 · 10−16
Table 10.2: SEU cross sections of all tested systems
The fabric SRAM showed a very good cross section of 2.36 · 10−14cm2/Bit
which is very similar to the one found for the ESRAM.
For the arithmetic blocks multipliers and multiplier accumulators were tested.
The results were a cross section of about 1.5·10−11cm2/Bit for multipliers and
6.5·10−12cm2/Bit for the multiplier accumulators. The failure dose during
this measurement was 480 Gy.
For counters both a combination of 32 single-byte counters and one 512 bit
counter together with a TMRed 512 bit counter were tested. The resulting
cross sections were 2.46·10−14cm2/Bit for the multi counter and
1.7·10−14cm2/Bit for the 512 bit counter. The TMR-protected 512 bit coun-
ters showed a very low cross section with 4.73·10−16cm2/Bit. This is very
interesting because this cross section is lower than the TMR-protected ﬂip-
ﬂops. The board failed at 610 Gy during this test.
The CoreABC was tested up to a dose of 580 Gy, and no upsets or transmis-
sion interruptions were detected.
By irradiating the FPGA with dose steps of 5-10 Gy between reprogramming
it the maximal dose for reprogramming was measured. A total of 72 Gy could
be withstood before losing the ability to reprogram the FPGA. Table 10.2
shows all cross sections calculated from the diﬀerent irradiation tests.
10.4 Conclusion
Overall the results from the SmartFusion2/Igloo2 irradiation campaign are
very good. The resulting cross sections are comparable to results gained from
testing the ProAsic3 [70]. The test of the eNVM in the microcontroller sub-
system revealed some serious weakness to radiation. The observed high and
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constant error numbers hint at the unresponsiveness of a sector of the eNVM.
The SEU cross section of the SRAM is satisfying for radiation-tolerant com-
ponents. Both eNVM and eSRAM can only be reached using the internal
AHB bus of the SmartFusion2 which is, partially due to the toolchain and
documentation of Microsemi, quite challenging. The usage of external ﬂash
and SRAM might in many cases be the more practical choice. Therefore, the
unsatisfying results from the eNVM are not critical for the utilization of the
FPGA.
114
Chapter 11
Conclusion
11.1 Conclusion of the Project
Premature beam dumps due to radiation-induced errors in LHC systems have
been one of the important sources of lost integrated luminosity in the last
few years. In order to fulﬁll the project goals of the HL-LHC phase the
number of such errors has to be reduced signiﬁcantly even though the radi-
ation levels will increase, depending on location, by factors between 10-100
times the current levels. Therefore a concentrated eﬀort has been made to
increase the radiation tolerance of all relevant systems. The main goal of this
project was the increase of the radiation tolerance of a new quench detec-
tion system for the 600 A magnets of the LHC. The new system was aimed
to produce only two radiation errors every year during the HL-LHC phase.
The steps required to achieve this were to verify the behavior of all used
electric components under radiation and if necessary to develop mitigation
measures against radiation induced faults. Unfortunately, the behavior of
electronic components under radiation is neither known to the manufacturer
nor possible to be predicted by simple means. Therefore, experiments in
which components are artiﬁcially irradiated with a high dose while acquir-
ing all possible output parameters, are necessary to determine the radiation
tolerance of a component. In the scope of this project, several irradiation
campaigns were conducted, testing all components required for the project
itself and several others which were parts of other projects or considered
useful for future projects. Over the course of these campaigns a lot of ex-
perience and techniques were acquired how to conduct eﬃcient irradiation
campaigns, which will be useful for future similar endeavors. The results of
the irradiation campaign revealed the radiation vulnerability of one of the
core components of the new QDS, the ADS1281 ADC. Several failure modes
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Figure 11.1: The fault times compared here are from a time interval between
the ﬁrst January and the 15. of August of the years 2015 and 2016. Many
groups including the QPS group were able to signiﬁcantly reduce the failure
time their system produced.
were found which would cause a beam dump in most cases and whose com-
bined cross section would make the two errors a year target impossible. In
order to understand the origin of these error modes, the behavior of the ADC
was simulated using the LabView environment. After understanding the be-
havior of the failure modes several mitigation measures were developed. The
measures were in turn veriﬁed during irradiation campaigns and using the
LabView simulation and further improved upon. The resulting system is pre-
dicted to have an error cross section an order of magnitude lower than the
project target leading to only 0.2 errors every year during the HL-LHC phase.
In comparison, the previous QDS system was estimated to produce between
70-160 errors every year during HL-LHC so a signiﬁcant improvement was
achieved. The new system was introduced into the machine beginning 2016
and has since then produced not a single error that could be attributed to
the eﬀects of radiation. Starting with the year 2016 several other upgraded
systems, including the new 600 A QDS have been started operation and the
ﬁrst results are very good. Figures 11.2 and 11.1 show comparisons of stable
beam duration and system fault time between the years of 2015 and 2016.
As can be seen the fault times of equipment groups have decreased sig-
niﬁcantly. In 2016 the fault time produced by the QPS is only about 15% of
the fault time in 2015. This reduction in failures has also lead to a signiﬁ-
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Figure 11.2: Between the years 2015 and 2016 the average duration of a
stable beam changes signiﬁcantly. This was achieved by reducing the amount
of faults that cause a premature beam abort. The average lifetime increased
from about 5 hours in 2015 to about 10 hours in 2016.
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cant increase in average lifetime of stable beams. The average beam lifetime
increased from about 5 hours in 2015 to about 10 hours in 2016. The overall
equipment upgrades of the LHC protection systems in general and speciﬁcally
the upgrade of the 600 A QDS can be called a full success.
11.2 Outlook
While already a high increase in accelerator availability was achieved in the
time frame of this work development of this system will not cease. While the
approach of using low cost electronic components to create systems with high
radiation tolerance is fairly unique to CERN there are several other equip-
ments groups working on similar projects. All these groups are connected
within the Radiation to Electronics group at CERN and will gain something
from the results produced during this work. One example is the MAX11100
which was qualiﬁed in this work and will be used as part of the new main
quadrupole QDS that is currently in development. From the test results of
the SmartFusion2/Igloo2 it can be concluded that this device can be used
for several future projects. One important candidate will be the develop-
ment of the QDS for the high luminosity magnets that will be included into
the LHC during the change to the HL-LHC phase. The continuous eﬀort to
prepare the LHC for the HL phase will keep this topic interesting for the fore-
seeable future. Depending on the layout of the future FCC accelerator this
type of development of system will persist into this era. A parallel equipment
tunnel to the accelerator tunnel would allow to place all electronic systems in
safe zones without damaging levels of radiation. But such a parallel tunnel
would increase the cost of the FCC project considerably. Therefore, there
is a high probability that the FCC will have a need for low cost electronic
systems with a high radiation tolerance as they are described in this work.
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